• Chapter 0, the dialogical approach: Mr. Kaninchente. This essay was written as a dialogue, as I was deeply influenced by the dialogues I had read from Plato, Rényi, Hofstadter, Carroll, Lewis & Lewis. I had a grand vision for my new site, Dialogical Essays.

• Chapter 0.5, the cheapskate approach: Mind as a Figment of Yours, Shuzan’s Shippé, Free and Unhappy, Happy and Unfree. I really wanted to get a bunch of writing out there and share my ideas. In preparation for chapter 1, I thought I should release some essays I wrote for school.

• Chapter 1, the dedicated approach: How Might One Live, How to Think For Yourself, Metaphorical and phenomenological ramblings on libraries, creation, and Tōru Takemitsu, How to make sure you actually answer the questions you ask, Understanding the meaning of life by understanding meaning itself, Currents are at fault for everything that has ever happened and everything that ever will, An introduction to the Zettelkasten as a garden for growing knowledge, Some philosophical underpinnings of the Zettelkasten: Rhizomes, Maps, and Immanence, Growing Knowledge as Play, Becoming Unknown: Germination, What about purely conceptual art?, and Good jargon, bad jargon. This is Immanent Essays. I put in a great effort in crafting each word of each of these, but I got burnt out quickly. I did not want to spend my time writing essays and worrying about them.

• Chapter 2, the slop approach: Philosophy sucks, but it’s too useful to give up, Why your productivity system keeps failing, How to build a productivity system around problems, How to decide what to work on today, What keeps you up at night, Why you keep forgetting what matters, What your bad habits are for, Going up from feeling down, What does the lemonade stand want?, Being vegan brought down my GPA. Conceptually, I am most proud of these essays. Each one builds on the rest, creating a guide to living well. Except for the very first one, Philosophy sucks, I don’t like these essays. Except for the first one, I make heavy use of AI to make my ideas the most presentable to the people I wanted to read my essays.

I want to open a new chapter for Immanent Essays, marked by an egotistical approach. I’ll write what I want to, when I want to. I will write for myself, for specific readers, or for nobody at all. But the one constant is that I will be the one writing.

I don’t make a profit writing essays. I do make a revenue from the few paid subscribers I have (why did I even enable that?), but the amount of time I invest Is worth more than that. A quick estimate, I make about ¢50 per hour put in. Back in chapter 1, that would have been ¢10 or less simply because of how much time I put in. But that approach was more worthwhile: each essay taught me something different. I haven’t seen that in the past few essays.

As much as I enjoy those essays, being that dedicated is not sustainable. Yet I cannot offload the act of writing. What to do? My answer is to focus on writing for myself.

With the exception of chapter 0.5, I wrote to transform my readers. What does switching to an egotistical approach mean for this? Unfortunately, those who have subscribed for my “How To” essays might be in for a reckoning. If you are looking for simple and digestible lessons, I am sorry.

I don’t exactly know what I’ll be writing about, but it might be anything from super technical to super experimental to completely bland to whatever. Knowing me, it won’t be straightforward.

Because of this great essay by Henrik Karlsson, I might alienate my readers. But at the same time, that might be the necessary move to make Immanent Essays truly work.

Ultimately the product that any writer has to sell is not the subject being written about, but who he or she is. On Writing Well

That’s the other side of my egotistical approach. It’s an arrogant belief that being egotistical will be better for the readers. I’ll be writing for myself, for you, for myself.

If you want to get digestible lessons from me, just point an LLM to my website and ask it to talk to you. I genuinely think that would be a great thing to do (just don’t believe everything it says, just like you shouldn’t believe everything I say).

Leave a comment

See you later!

Huh? Philosophy? If you have any idea about what philosophers do today, you might scoff at this claim, alongside 23% of adults in the US in 20192. Rightly so, when the fuss is about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin3. The debate around such a question strikes us as useless and nonsensical:

• Useless because it doesn’t help us do anything, unlike a debate on socialized healthcare

• Nonsensical because argumentation can continue forever without making any ground, unlike arguments in physics which can be resolved by experiment

Moreover, you might think that all debates in philosophy are similarly useless and nonsensical. I disagree because there is also much genuine philosophizing in that tradition, discipline, and body of knowledge. Take a historical look:

• Socialized healthcare comes from ‘moral philosophers’ concerned with the role of the state. Only with time did political theorists and scientists get separated from philosophy.

• Physics began as a part of ‘natural philosophy’, and only eventually came to be a distinct endeavor.

All this said, I only find philosophy enriching when it helps with philosophizing. This is crucial. I don’t find most of philosophy useful; my point here is not to convince you to engage with philosophy. Instead, it is to urge you to care about philosophizing well, because philosophizing well is key to achieving your goals. Let me explain.

Goals are problems. Your New Year’s resolution to decrease time spent with screens, a goal, is equivalent to the problem of spending too much time with screens. But that’s quite negative, so why look at things that way?

The reason is that problems help us understand what goals are at a deeper level, one where we can understand what philosophizing is, what engineering is, how we can accomplish our goals, and more. (Just so you know, I will tackle engineering in a later essay, not this one.)

So, what is a problem? A problem is some part of the world that someone wants to get rid of. In the case of your New Year’s resolution, you spend too much time with screens. Since you want to get rid of that aspect of reality, it poses a problem. We know it is a problem because you keep getting bothered by it; it is problematic. When you work towards that goal and reduce your screen time, the problem resolves and stops bothering you. In a sense, problems are self-destructive, but that wording may lead to misunderstanding.

Since problems push you to get rid of them, they are actually constructive. They help change the world, usually creating many more problems in the process! When you reduce your screen time, for instance, you might regain enough time to want to learn the piano. This ambition technically poses a new problem that calls for change, for getting rid of itself. However, problems may never end: since you could always get better at playing the piano, the problem will never fully resolve. Instead, it will subtly transform as you resolve sub-problems such as not knowing how to play scales, chords, or pieces.

Another example of a problem: when I was drafting this essay, I ran into quite a few issues:

1. I had some idea of what I wanted to write, but getting words onto the page was crucifying. What’s more, when the words were finally written, they felt utterly inadequate.

2. I strongly desired to get rid of that feeling of inadequacy, which meant releasing a good essay written in a good way.

3. I resolved the problem by philosophizing, which is to say, by engaging in conceptual problematic exploration.

When you look online for ways to reduce your screen time, you are exploring different ways you could go about resolving the problem. In other words, you are exploring the problem, or engaging in problematic exploration. Philosophizing is just problematic exploration where the problems and/or explorations are conceptual. It might help to continue my example:

1. When I faced my problem of writing, I brought myself to understand the problem more conceptually: “I want to write this well, but I’m not.”

2. From there, I explored ways I might think about the whole project. It occurred to me that I could get clarity by thinking about what it means to write well.

3. Next, I kept thinking through questions that came to me—in the manner I have written about in a previous essay—until I had made a list of steps I could take to create what you are reading now.

This understanding of philosophizing is quite broad since it extends quite further from what is accepted as philosophy. That’s not an accident. Philosophizing occurs all the time in the hard, social, and interdisciplinary sciences, as well as the humanities, engineering, business, and countless other endeavors. Whenever you encounter problems and wrestle with them conceptually, you are philosophizing.

Furthermore, it should be clear how practical my philosophizing was. Philosophizing is always practical since it is always about the problems you actually encounter4. As such, philosophizing is about exploring meanings, possibilities, realities, and how one might live.

Moreover, since problems don’t always resolve cleanly, philosophizing doesn’t always come to an end. If you want to understand what it means to be a citizen, you might constantly be on the hunt for insights, developing your understanding as the very definition of your chase changes constantly. Philosophizing is not always problem solving, but always problem exploring. Even though problems are conceptualized negatively, they are at heart constructive and productive.

Cool. But I still haven’t explained why you need to care so much about it. Can’t others philosophize, while you focus on applying what they figure out?

You need to care because philosophizing is always particular. The problems that bug you are always particular problems which must be resolved particularly each time. Even if somebody already found a solution to your problem, you must think the solution again if you are to actually have your problem resolved. You cannot let anybody else do it for you.

For example, I have been greatly influenced by the philosopher Gilles Deleuze. I would not be surprised if, in his book What is philosophy?5, he wrote about all the problems I tackle in this essay. Yet, I could never let Deleuze philosophize for me. I can only use his thinking and his problems when I find them problematic myself.6

The particularity of philosophizing is especially clear in my problem with writing. I have read many books and articles on writing, but in the end it is up to me to find what works for me. Here’s writer William Zinsser’s summary in his book On Writing Well:

there isn’t any “right” way to do such personal work. There are all kinds of writers and all kinds of methods, and any method that helps you to say what you want to say is the right method for you.

You can only learn which method is right for you by trying different methods out.

One last thing: you must philosophize well to achieve your goals. Philosophizing well means resolving your problems by reasoning and creating concepts. It involves making sense of things and holding yourself to the standards you and your problems set. If you do all that already, you already philosophize! Just imagine how much you could achieve if you worked at it more deliberately, improving it skillfully.

I won’t pretend to have mastered the art and science of philosophizing, but I think it is my strong suit. The philosophizing I did was essential to writing this essay satisfactorily. I know this to be true because I followed proven reasoning methods and saw through the problem by making concepts where there were none before. I continue to notice problems and philosophize about them, getting better and better each time.

The Immanent Essays I write are products of genuine philosophizing. With each essay I hope to help people philosophize well by showing how to explore problems, how to reason, and how to create concepts. Beyond placing tools in toolboxes, I also aim to provide sources of philosophizing which inspire philosophizing along similar lines, letting people find new paths through their own problems.

If you would like to better achieve your goals, please come back in the following weeks! I will release essays on how you can set yourself up to utilize problems on your journey through them.

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Are you left with problems and questions? Please share in a comment, email, or even a whole essay! Philosophizing well is an essential skill that requires practice to hone.

I leave you with some problems and questions of my own:

• How should we balance 1) digesting philosophical artifacts7 without much motivation and 2) philosophizing on our own?

• How important is philosophizing outside of philosophy?

• What might engineering be in terms of problems?

• What are the key differences between goals and problems?

• There are many respects in which philosophy education gets in the way of philosophizing, yet I feel that philosophizing should take center stage. Argh!

• Since philosophizing is particular, how are we able to build from our previous events of philosophizing, or even philosophical artifacts of others?

Some if not all of these will be addressed in future essays.

Thanks to Alex and Daniel for their most helpful feedback on earlier drafts!

The analogous thing in non-Cantorian set theory is to choose the new set a as a nonconstructible set, then to generate a new model N consisting of all sets obtained by the operations of restricted set theory applied to a and to the sets in M.1

This is the first sentence of a random paragraph of a random page of a random book on my shelf. In particular, this comes from a wonderful book called The Mathematical Experience. Other non-fiction books, and some fiction books, are full of words and phrases that are not immediately accessible to general readers.

In this mathematical case, it is unlikely that you know what is meant by “non-Cantorian” or “set theory” or “nonconstructible,” and so on. It is precisely this (un)likelihood that makes the terms specialized: they are not general terms that a randomly selected person would know. Rather, they are terms frequently employed by people in specific domains. In this case, mathematics.

Jargon is a synonym for specialized vocabulary, but carries a negative connotation. If you spoke to a non-mathematician exactly as the quote reads, they might ask you to “repeat that without jargon,” or “in simple terms.” Now let’s see what happens when we do so:

The analogous thing in mathematical theories of groups of things without repeating any of those things that reject the notion that a group of things without repetition can be made of one thing in the groups that are things in any group without repetition of groups without repetition, and where there is at least one thing in each of those groups, is to choose the new group of things without repeating any, call it …

That slog is the result of ‘translating’ “The analogous thing in non-Cantorian set theory is to choose the new set ”. While you may not have understood the sentence with specialized vocabulary, at least you had a chance. After learning the vocabulary, you could understand it with ease. In contrast, this ‘translation’ is unwieldy and unclear. There are bad aspects of specialized vocabulary, but there are good aspects as well.

This is the first of a series of essays in which I examine the ways by which we can and should relate to specialized vocabulary. Ultimately, how we treat specialized vocabulary depends on the context of its use. This time, I write about how specialized vocabulary helps in growing knowledge.

Specialized Vocabulary and Growing Knowledge

Even though bad practices sometimes endure the passage of time, in general, good practices prevail. In the phenomenon of evolution, ‘good’ adaptions end up proliferating in organisms while the ‘bad’ adaptions end up dying out—unless, by a stroke of luck, some other factor helps maintain that adaption.

Given that people with special knowledge tend to use specialized vocabulary, we should expect its use to have some positive consequences. We can expect specialized vocabulary to be ‘good’ adaptions. Indeed, specialized vocabulary is an important factor in growing knowledge embedded in layers of context.

You can see this context on display in my translation of the excerpt from The Mathematical Experience. I had to find non-specialized terms for non-Cantorian set theory, and in doing so, drew back the layers of concepts upon concepts. These layers make up the context in which non-Cantorian set theory is embedded, allowing the phrase to make sense to those with that specialized knowledge.

There are two important ways in which specialized vocabulary enables not just knowledge but the growth of knowledge in these knowledge domains. The first is that specialized vocabulary permits finer communication, and the second is that specialized vocabulary enables deeper understanding.

Specialized vocabulary helps in precise communication2. Even though I could replace every instance of ‘set’ with “group of things without any of those things repeating,” it is not very precise. For instance, within mathematics, ‘set’ is a concept distinct from ‘collection,’ and “group of things…” could apply to either.

Another benefit of the precision afforded by specialized vocabulary is the clarity and perspective it brings. When people have to work with a lot of different and complex layers of concepts, specialized vocabulary is gradually created to make handling the concepts easier. Once they are easier to handle, they can be brought together in different ways. Re-organizing concepts can reveal new patterns, furthering the understanding even deeper within a knowledge domain.

Sometimes, this ‘shortcut’ into a concept is a nice phrase rather than a word. In some contexts of writing or thinking, where precision is guaranteed in some other ways, you can get away with whatever text you would like, so long as there is a link between what you handle (word, phrase, sentence) and what you refer to (complex concept network).

In a Zettelkasten, you can treat individual notes as referents.3 As I refer to concepts within my Zettelkasten, I quite literally link some text to another note. It does not matter whether the note I am linking to is some thoughts I had about decision theory, whether it was a small note I recorded while on the bus, or this very essay. The cherry on top is that I do not have to scratch my brain to remember what a specific term is, or what “what I thought on May 6th” means. I can simply follow the link and read the note I had written.

Specialized vocabulary is clearly important. There are instances, like the quote from the Mathematical Experience, where it is required. It plays a key factor in building deep understanding. However, it might play an equally important role in preventing us from growing knowledge. Next time, I will take a look at how specialized vocabulary can get in the way of attempts at clarity and understanding.

Interested not only in feeling, but also conceptualizing, I ask “What is art?” This question interests me because it allows me to explore what art means, both to me and to others, and also because it allows me to explore what art could mean that it does not yet.

I have come to understand art as a source of currents that flow into people non-conceptually. Listening to Toward the Sea, a work of art by Tōru Takemitsu, something within me changes—I do not know what, I do not know why, but I know that. The music leads me, through its currents, to experiment (perhaps in effort to understand), to imagine, and to act, even though I do not conceptualize it.

The same can be said of paintings, of installations, of poetry, of sculpture, cuisine, and so many more forms of art. However, each of these works of art have media through which the art-form is registered by the senses. Toward the Sea, for example, can be accessed by listening (sense) to musicians perform (media) the piece (form) as designed by Takemitsu.

Interested not only in sensation, but also conceptualizing, I ask “What about purely conceptual art?” This question interests me because it allows me to explore possibilities of art beyond those usually understood, and also because as it allows me to bring art into new domains that I find enthralling.

Conceptual art, as a term, is already employed. It refers to artworks that have interesting conceptual bases which are implemented through various media. What I am interested in here is purely conceptual artworks, which use concepts as their medium.

Without any examples to think about, such an artwork could seem impossible. One piece, which I give the tentative name Virus, is the concept that propagates through minds, perhaps alike a concept that invades the mental capacity of people. The content of the thought is self-reflective: it is this very thought that thinks about itself as the thought that it is, and also thinks about its capability of being replicated in other minds. When I describe this thought to you, the reader, you may find yourself with this very same thought, which now occupies even more minds!

I do not think it is unfathomable to view Virus as a piece of art. Perhaps not a particularly great one (though I quite enjoy it). I have specified its form, and the medium is thought. What is different is that there does not seem to be any “essential” relation with the senses, like paintings have with vision, or music with hearing.

Now, poetry can be seen as coming close to purely conceptual art. Both involve bringing something to mind, particularly language. But where the medium of purely conceptual art is concepts, the medium of poetry is language. You cannot reword a poem and have the same poem, but you can reword a conceptual artwork and have the same piece.

Another example, tentatively titled Point Vanishing, is quite a perplexing one. First, take a moment to feel the piece, as the more you read on, the less you will be able to access it. The concept this time is the non-conceptualization of itself. As soon as you have the concept in mind, you are not witnessing it as itself as an artwork. But when you are not conceptualizing it, you witness it—though in what sense I do not quite know.

These two pieces might strike you as interesting “thought experiments.” But there is a crucial difference: thought experiments, in philosophy, are conducted in order to test intuitions and logical consequences for a productive end, whereas these examples do not aim toward any kind of productivity. When I create purely conceptual art, I engage in play.

All of this discussion makes my initial claim of art suspicious, that artworks are sources of currents that flow non-conceptually. How could “purely conceptual art flow non-conceptually?” However, I do not think that purely conceptual artworks are exceptions to this claim. While initially conceptual, the ways in which purely conceptual artworks create currents are the same as those present in other art forms. The flow is not based on comprehension of ‘why’ some fact is the case, like, for instance, why every number has a prime factorization. That kind of understanding creates currents of number theory that are conceptual in nature. The currents of purely conceptual artworks inspire are different, and are gained through inspiration, perplexity, and beauty. They are not founded in comprehension.

My point in bringing up purely conceptual art is not to establish it as a revolutionary art form. It is not to demonstrate how versatile art can be, nor how far expression can extend. It is to pose questions that are relevant to the conditions of existence and see where they lead—the unknown.

The title of the album is Decomposition: Fox on a Highway. The tracks of the album are titled to describe the happenings of a decomposing fox: worms enter its body, its body bloats, cars pass by, until finally the worms exit the body—rather, what used to be a body.

If you let this prolonged event infiltrate your awareness—which you will naturally avoid doing—you will experience revulsion. You might feel queasy, nauseous, unsettled.

What you will feel is called “Animal-Reminder Disgust”, which is elicited by an identification of the self as an animal. Unconsciously, you are reminded of how you are the same as the fox. If things had been different, it could be you on the highway—Worms In, Bloat, Everyone Passing, and finally Worms Out.

The natural response to this disgust is to reinforce the self as distinct from animals. We are better than animals. We are special.

But what are we, if not animals?

Self-Subjectivity

Turning to the natural sciences will help answer this question, but they can only describe the objective aspects of our selves. They emphasize our animal-nature, making even our subjective experience animal. The natural-scientific picture is not complete.

Turn instead to your own experience of self. How does it feel? How does it change depending on what you are doing? Do you lose it sometimes?

Personally, I lose it frequently. When I am engrossed in conversation, work, exercising, and watching something online, the sense of “I” seems to disappear. Remarkably, this disappearance of the “I” is only determined when it returns, when I take a look at my body and come to the flabbergasting realization—perhaps decision—that “I am Louis, nothing more than this chunk of flesh and thought.”

Even though there is no self-consciousness while the self is lost, this immersed-self still seems to be, somehow, part of our ‘grander’ self. On the other hand, the experience of oneself as an individual-self along the lines of “oh, this was me the whole time,” also seems to be part of who we are.

But this individual-self is not the only one of which I become conscious. There are times that, instead of the individual-self, the “I” transforms into something larger-than-life. To understand what I mean, think about the sheer magnitude of human history. Try to feel how long ago the pharaoh Ramses II lived, how much happened since then… and that even human history is minuscule compared to the timescale of life on Earth, and the Earth to the universe as a whole. Sometimes, somehow, I identify not with Louis, but with this vast situation which encompasses countless lives and countless deaths, including my own. I, Louis, will die. But I am more than Louis, I am an eternal-self.

Self-Simulation

From the point of view of the eternal-self, my everyday affairs, both immersive and individual, do not feel real. They are fictive, created simply to keep the processes of the world moving. “Is this who I am? Somebody who takes a bus or rides a bicycle to sit in a room and listen to someone talk for hours, somebody who enjoys eating but cannot stand Natto, somebody who could be hit by a car and decompose on the road?”

Any terms I assign to myself—“student,” “foodie,” “mortal”—all become roles that Louis acts out while engaging with the world. The self, marked by “self-knowledge,” is simulation, where knowledge of the self is identifying roles that are simulated by the self.

What then is the “true”-self, beyond simulation? What are we, at a deeper level than simulation? Perhaps we are simply, truly, the eternal-self—except that the eternal-self is too impersonal to be me, myself. Additionally, this eternal-self is not truly deeper than simulations. It merely assembles a cast of characters together and observes the theater unfold.

Abstrusity

The true-self is abstruse: some parts known, and some parts unknown. It is not complete knowledge, for that is simulation. It is not complete unknown, for then there is no self at all. The true-self is not found through self-knowledge, but abstrusity.

When people suffer from existential anxiety, from being unsure of themselves, they expect self-knowledge of something that is fundamentally abstruse, fundamentally marred with the unknown. Inner peace does not come from self-knowledge, but from understanding the self as unknowable.

Another complexity arises. If your true self is how you are at any moment, does it really capture everything about you? You can never be your true self, you can only become it. Being true to yourself, or rather your true-self, is about becoming something new through a mixture of the known and the unknown. It is being unsettled, or rather rejecting permanent settlement.

This rejecting of permanent settlement, this self-nomadism, realizes the true-self. Practically, it means experimenting, diving head-first into the unknown. We are not held back by simulations, by pre-existing knowledge of what we are. We re-create ourselves experimentally and find our true-selves as we become unknown.

Resources

The amazing album Decomposition: Fox on a Highway is by Saapato and collaborators.

My understanding of Animal-Reminder Disgust comes from the section “Animal-Nature Disgust” of Chapter 10 of the open access textbook Psychology of Human Emotion.

Many of the ideas are not from, but influenced by my premature understanding of the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Often it is from recognizing interesting terms like ‘nomadology’ and running away with them.

My notion of abstrusity developed from running away with ideas while reading selections from the Daodejing, translated by Edmund Ryden. It is influenced by some cursory reading I had done of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense.

My understanding of experimental is influenced by a passage from John Cage’s Silence, as reported by the Emergent Futures Lab website.

All artwork is by Paul Klee.

But I do not go to the courts because it is exercise, even though it is. Nor do I go because it helps me get closer to my friends or because it passes the time. It is play, which is done for its own sake.

Play might be defined as any activity that, being done for its own sake, involves the expression of the player(s). Play is not even done for the sake of fun—it just happens to be fun.

Activities where you partake for the sake of some emotional stimulus, and, perhaps also themselves, include watching TV, scrolling through social media. These are not play. And what I find most distinctive between those activities and play is expression. Watching TV is an act of passive consumption, wheras playing badminton involves developing character and actively creating a personal style of play.

Another form of play I partake in is growing knowledge. Among my fellow aspiring intellectuals, research and writing are often seen as tasks, even if enjoyable. I see it as a fundamentally different activity.

And this approach has important consequences on people who do not work directly with knowledge, opening possibilities for more people. See, you may think of my knowledge growth as a luxury I am particularly fortunate to afford, but I disagree.1 In reality, the affordable form of growing knowledge is when it is play.

Interestingly, the key to all of this is not very difficult to understand or put into practice—the key is the Zettelkasten.

Accessibly Growing Knowledge

Some people in the world are fortunate enough to be able to devote most of their time to growing their knowledge. They read and write books and papers, attend conferences to listen to and give talks.

Most people are not like them. But the difference those fortunate few and the majority is not capability or interest, but simply the ability to devote time. That affordability is often one of circumstance and luck, which is very unfortunate—I believe that growing knowledge should be a possibility for everybody, not just those with ample time to do so.

Furthermore, the traditional conception of growing knowledge involves sitting down at a desk for an extended period of time, writing, reading pondering. Sometimes, it is going down to a lab to conduct some heavy-duty experiments. This is simply not possible for most people.

Thankfully, for those who cannot afford to devote such lengths of time or such mental energy, the traditional picture can be set aside. The alternative uses the Zettelkasten emphasizing its ability to grow knowledge ambiently.

Ambient Knowledge Growth

Taking notes without a Zettelkasten, you might have different notebooks for different projects, or maybe different school subjects. To grow knowledge, you write in these notebooks and read from them afterwards. Some sections of a notebook might become blog posts, and others might be practice for intense conversations.

But this requires some time to sit, study, and write. Many people never look back through their notes, and as a result their knowledge does not grow. And for this approach to taking notes, projects are crucial—without a project in mind, all the notes would be rigidly classified, unable to cross-polinate. You could not know which projects you might have in the future would benefit from some knowledge you' have picked up!

The Zettelkasten structure, by making all the knowledge immanent, places the emphasis not on projects but on the pieces of knowledge and their connections.

You can simply collect information you find interesting and make connections with other pieces of information. Notice that any information you find interesting has vast potential of future connections—you are not limited by the scope of a project. Instead, over time, scoped groups of connections appear organically that can be converted into fully-formed projects.

Also, with this approach, even if you work from within a project, the insights can be taken out of context and into other contexts, other projects, so that research for any project is research done for any number of any other potential projects.

In other words, the work you do is not merely directed towards individual projects, but rather ambiently growing knowledge from which multiple projects can emerge.

Ambience and Accessibility

This property of ambience also results in a greater accessibility.

Since your efforts grow the garden ambiently, you do not have to work in the context of strict broundaries. You do not have to sit and stomach an entire book over months, eventually forgetting much of the context of a project. Instead, you can pick up what is interesting, and save it as an investment into a future connection.

If you have 15 minutes to spare, you could read a few pages of a book and take some short notes. Sometime in the future, you might look at those notes and make connections with some others. You might use your notes you put together a short paragraph about a subject. A few more of those, and you could have an essay published.

That is at the core of how I work with my Zettelkasten: When something feels right to dig into, when it is interesting or convenient, I can make valuable connections and grow my knowledge. It seems awfully playful, and that is because it is!

Playfully Growing Knowledge

For an activity to be play, according to my definition earlier, it must be done for its own sake. When working with projects in mind, research is done with the research question in mind—a sake other than itself. But in the Zettelkasten, where research can be done ambiently, sources are explored and connections are made on the basis of themselves being interesting—their own sake.

Another required aspect of play, as I mentioned, is expression. It is not difficult to realize how expressive and personal note making is. Note making is about incorporating yourself, since every connection you make is a result of your entire life.

Growing your knowledge does not have to be some elusive activity that could only be possible in another life. It is something you can grow slowly, ambiently, and in the time between your larger commitments. While growing in this way, you engage in a profound act of personal expression, and find an extremely rewarding mode of play.

Resources

There are more thoughts on ambient knowledge growth from Andy Matuschak’s ‘Executable strategy for writing’ note, under the name ‘undirected’. I highly recommend his notes for deep practical and theoretical insights into knowledge growth.

Some of my thoughts on the accessibility that Zettelkasten provides come from the so-so book Digital Zettelkasten Principles, Methods, & Examples and the fantastic book Where Good Ideas Come From. Where Good Ideas Come From is an amazing source to begin taking notes on, since it details creativity, problem solving, science, and much more.

There are more resources on getting started with Zettelkasten on my introductory post.

You can read more about Deleuze from my introductory essay, How Might One Live.

Among Deleuze’s many concepts1 is the rhizome, a structure that allows mapping, itself another Deleuzian concept. The understanding of a Zettelkasten as a rhizome, and thus as a knowledge structure that allows for mapping, makes it ideal for ‘immanent knowledge growth,’ an insight of my own.2

Rhizome

The easiest way to make the rhizome intuitive is to compare it to its antithesis: the arborescent. If you know your way around English words, you will notice a hint of ‘tree’ in ‘arborescent.’

Indeed, appealing to trees is the best way to explain arborescent structure: the structure involves a trunk which splits into multiple branches. Then, those branches split further into branches, and on it goes. Every branch can be traced down to the trunk.

While trees might best represent arborescent structure, the structure is present elsewhere. Many non-Zettelkasten note-taking approaches have arborescent structure: organize your files into where they belong, keep them in the right notebook, and categorize new ideas into their correct spot.

But our ideas are not necessarily correct, but often experimental.

The word “experimental” is apt, providing it is understood not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown. (John Cage, Silence p.13)3

As experimental, our ideas are unknown. How could we know the implications of radically new thoughts before thinking them through and letting them grow? And given how the best ideas are often those that cross disciplines, the arborescent structure, disallowing such crossing, inhibits creativity.

The alternative structure archetype is rhizomatic, where nodes (in our case notes) are not placed into any intrinsic hierarchy. To picture a rhizome, imagine cutting each branch of a tree. With the pile of sticks that is left, you can build anything you would like by creating connections where otherwise they would be impossible.

Zettelkasten as Rhizome

That ‘cutting’ visualization is not an accident. We only realize new connections, and therefore new constructions, when we separate ideas from their context.

This is key to the Zettelkasten’s claim of being rhizomatic. Continuing the terminology from Growing Knowledge with a Zettelkasten, we can tap into the power of rhizomatic structures only when we interact with small, individual pieces of knowledge. That is just what Zettelkasten enables.

But is the Zettelkasten, as a rhizomatic structure, really more creative than a non-rhizomatic knowledge structure? The answer is yes, because it enables mapping.

Mapping

Where the rhizomatic structure can be explained in contrast to the arborescent structure, mapping can be explained in contrast to tracing.

Like you would expect, tracing involves replication and representation. Something traced is judged by its deviations from what was traced; by the quality of representation. That much is obvious, but what is less obvious is that arborescent structures encourage tracing.

Consider one of the biggest knowledge trees around, Wikipedia. Wikipedia serves to represent the knowledge of the world, replicating it into the various languages of its articles. Articles are judged by factual accuracy, not by ‘creativity’ or ‘originality.’

In fact, creative work on Wikipedia is removed.4 This is a result of the arborescent structure of Wikipedia, where there is an effort to represent and be ‘correct.’

The antithesis to tracing is mapping, which involves creativity. Or, more illustratively put, creation.

Take two artists, both drawing the same scene. A passing art critic notices that one artist’s drawing “looks photographic” and the other’s “is completely unreal.” The other artist’s artwork is a product of mapping, where new possibilities are discovered—and where genius often lies.

And where tracing is arborescent, mapping is rhizomatic. This can be demonstrated by highlighting the mapping in Zettelkasten.

Mapping with Zettelkasten

See, working with a Zettelkasten is all about mapping. It is imperative to understand that a Zettelkasten is not an encyclopedia; and it is not meant to merely trace the world, but also create it.

Rather than trying to represent reality objectively, a Zettelkasten involves highly personal work. It might be said that a Zettelkasten is essentially personal, and as such requires you to think for yourself.

Whenever you make your own understanding of some material, you take note of it in your Zettelkasten. Whenever you come up with your own intriguing ideas, you make note of it in your Zettelkasten. Beyond being a place to keep your existing knowledge, it is a space for your new, experimental, creative understanding.

But something is lacking here between the ideas of mapping and rhizome. Bridging the two is immanence.

Immanence

Immanent structures are those where everything interacts at the same level.

To illustrate: Working on various projects often means separating concerns between the projects. You might be working towards a report, assembling materials for the report, and keeping them distinct from your hobbies. Many people even put completed projects behind them.

But it is easy to recognize that some knowledge of materials science, economics, or medicine, earned in some professional context, can play a role in becoming a better tennis player, a completely different context. When knowledge is immanent, the boundaries that projects create are broken down.

And where boundaries are broken, tracing is impossible. Instead, knowledge is mapped out and becomes resources for even more potential connections. And these connections, relating relevant materials, consistently creates relevant connections. This is the immanence of which I am interested.

This structural quality of immanence is present in the rhizome, which thrives with immanence. Naturally, so does the Zettelkasten.

Immanent Zettelkasten

Knowledge in the Zettelkasten is immanent. It is a rhizomatic vehicle of mapping, letting insights appear when they are relevant. Thus, the knowledge created with a Zettelkasten is consistently meaningful, consistently able to effect relevant people at their relevant levels.

You may have noticed that the name of my publication is Immanent Essays. The sense of ‘immanence’ is the same as described here,5 where everything is at the same level: meaningful and relevant.

Further, one of my goals with Immanent Essays is to write accessibly, such that it is capable of moving people of diverse walks of life. Ideally, the only prerequisite to learn from the essays is interest, not background.

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Resources

My understanding of rhizomatic and arborescent structures, as well as mapping and tracing, are mostly due to the great video Explaining Deleuze with Drum Machines. It is accessible and highly recommended.

There has been prior interest in the connections between Zettelkasten and Deleuze’s thought. Zettelkasten, Rhizomes, and You is a great article exploring the connections.

My understanding of immanence is influenced by Gilles Deleuze; an Introduction. I continue to enjoy this book as much as I learn from it, so I strongly recommend it to those with great interest in Deleuze.

I recommended a few Zettelkasten resources in my essay Growing Knowledge with a Zettelkasten. Rather than recommending more, I urge you devote more time to doing real work with your Zettelkasten!

These people have been accumulating knowledge for a while, often years, hopeful to grow it and share it with others. They write notes in their notebooks, on looseleaf paper, in Google Docs, or other ways they have seen work decently well.

Often they will see a graph of my notes and become curious about what I am doing.

They ask about what software I use, and I tell them about it. “The software I use is called Obsidian, but really the important thing is that I am maintaining a Zettelkasten.”

I guide them through some of the main ideas of the system, and they try it out excitedly. Some time later, they lament their time not growing a Zettelkasten.

This essay, the first of a few to come, will help you get started growing knowledge with a Zettelkasten. The focus will not be on specific software or paper, though I do highly recommend Obsidian.

Growing Knowledge

Firstly, it is important to clarify what I mean by ‘growing knowledge.’ There are essentially three parts to growing knowledge. And since growing is, to me, most clear in plants, I will use them in analogy: growing knowledge is like growing plants, from 1) getting seeds, 2) letting the seeds develop into plants, and 3) sharing the seeds you create.

Thus, in terms of knowledge, growth involves 1) picking up interesting information, 2) guiding the information to develop into new insights, and 3) sharing your insights with the world.

In this sense, the growth is not just personal, but also interpersonal. Often, by growing knowledge for yourself, you help others grow knowledge too.

And since you might have a garden to keep your various plants, you also have a space to keep and grow your knowledge. Many students take their notes in notebooks, in Google documents, in Apple notes, in Notion, or in Obsidian. When people stop being students, they often halt their note-taking completely. This is a shame, I think. I do not believe that a thirst for knowledge is lost upon donning a graduation cap.

In any case, there are various tools which can serve as places to keep your knowledge. But more important than the brand of notebook or software is the structure of the knowledge. Also, the most important consideration is whether you will actually use whatever you decide to use. I prefer some apps to others, but it would not matter if I did not use either!

Zettelkasten

The knowledge structure that I strongly recommend to everybody is the Zettelkasten. The term, in German, refers to boxes of paper slips, but what I take it to refer to is a specific structure. This structure involves every slip of paper, each with an individual piece of knowledge, standing on their own. In this way, each slip is a peer with every other slip. As every slip of paper, every note in Obsidian and Apple Notes, ideally contains an individual piece of knowledge, I will refer to the pieces of knowledge themselves being peers in the structure.

The note in the image is such an example:

From reading How to Take Smart Notes a bit over a year ago, I extracted this insight.1 Creating a Zettelkasten is just as easy; you just need to create notes that stand as peers in a structure like this.

But if every piece of knowledge is a peer with others, it would be difficult to find that specific fact from among thousands of others. Imagine having to find a specific dot on the graph image from earlier.

Other approaches resolve this problem by categorizing notes into different folders or boxes, embedding some within others. Categories might be like “Philosophy” where all the notes on philosophy would go, and “Mathematics” where all the notes on mathematics would go, and so on.

The Zettelkasten has a very different solution: linking. Notes refer to each-other, allowing you to connect notes not by shared topics but by specific, meaningful connections.

The specificity of connections is important here: I have quite a lot of notes on Zettelkasten, but I am able to access specific ideas related to a note by navigating its links.

So, when writing your notes, make sure to link to and from any individual note.

But what is the point of this? Linking enables you to maintain the various notes without strict hierarchy. Everything is simply a ‘piece of knowledge,’ ready to make connections and insights.

It is in this way that working with a Zettelkasten helps grow knowledge.

In fact, it also mirrors the aspects of growing knowledge mentioned earlier:

1. The knowledge you get from others become pieces of knowledge in the Zettelkasten, like my “systems with feedback are more likely to be engaged” note.

2. When you have insights, those insights are captured in the Zettelkasten as well, like “Zettelkasten allow for ambient productivity”.

3. And when you would like to share your knowledge with others, you have the Zettelkasten to turn to.

For that last bit, see for example this list of links from this essay’s note:

Pieces of Knowledge

Among the many elements of the Zettelkasten, the treatment of knowledge as individual pieces is crucial.

See, when I read books and find interesting information, I capture it in my Zettelkasten. I do the same with lectures and with conversations. I might end up with a very long file after some time taking notes. But what I do afterward is something quite unique to the Zettelkasten: I break up the longer notes into their individual pieces of knowledge, with the aim of having each note contain exactly one idea or concept.

This practice is key to the success of the structure, and it works because breaking up the context of ideas invites further creation. Without doing so, by keeping your notes in notebooks, for example, your notes on a lecture may be associated across a few pages, bundled together. How will the ideas from that lecture spread throughout the network of your understanding as a whole?

If you used index cards instead, you could split up your understanding of the lecture into various self-contained and cross-referencing cards. You would be able to arrange them in new ways, and with other index cards, gaining insights from the new arrangements.

The Zettelkasten structure, by keeping knowledge in these smaller pieces, makes cross-category growth of knowledge possible. That much, I hope, is clear. But it also lets knowledge from quite different points in time interact.

Every few days I encounter a piece of knowledge I had a few years ago. Recalling that past insight, I am able to create new connections between the current ideas in my mind and the wealth of knowledge from my past.

Such re-surfacing of ideas is often an afterthought of other systems. If you do not extract your notes from your notebooks, the best you can do is deciding to re-read old notebooks on a whim.

And this is why people are often so regretful of not starting sooner: maintaining a Zettelkasten is investing the current knowledge you have for exponential returns in the future. If you are interested in growing your knowledge, seriously think about starting a Zettelkasten. The best time to do so was yesterday, and the second best is now.

Further Resources

For a great example of Zettelkasten and insight into its inner workings, I recommend browsing and taking notes on Andy Matuschak’s working notes.

I often recommend this video by Odysseas to people who ask about the Obsidian software. I think it can help you get started, but keep in mind that the organization and methodology is very personal: I work quite differently from how he sets up his system. Alternatively, you might prefer this video where he goes through the process of his workflow.

A wealth of knowledge can be gained from the Zettelkasten.de site, both the blog posts and forum.

The book A System for Writing is a very accessible and practical guide to getting set up with a Zettelkasten.

With all these resources listed, you might be tempted to dive into each of them. But keep in mind that it is more important to get started and experiment than to carefully analyze how to ‘best’ get going.

After months of exploration and experimentation, you have pinned down a great philosophical theory.

You are itching to tell somebody about it, and it so happens that you are meeting with two philosophically interested friends in the evening—at your favorite restaurant, no less!

You arrive late to your friends already seated. They are in mid-conversation, but gesture upon noticing you.

“Glad you could make it,” one says.

“The pleasure is all mine,” you reply. “How have you two been?”

As much as you would like to jump straight into elaborating your theory, you know that your friends might have something to say too. In any case, you are curious about them.

“I’ve been OK,” one says, “but…”

“I haven’t,” says the other. “Rasha died on Sunday.”

“Oh no. I am sorry for your loss.”

At this point, it becomes clear that tonight is very likely not the right one to tell your friends of your discovery.

But how?

The answer lies in currents, parameters that cause effects.

Currents: Cause and Effect

There were many different ways you could have acted that evening. Instead of asking your friends how they were, you could have started explaining your theory right away.

While that was a possibility, it was not how it really happened. This distinction between possibility and reality is important in understanding currents. Generally, possibilities are the ontologies that are allowed under certain constraints. Think of an ‘ontology’ as a list of facts. In a game of Go, for instance, the placement of all the stones, and whose turn it is, are part of its ontology. The possibilities of your next turn are the stone placements and other factors that are allowed by the rules of the game.

Furthermore, possibilities are realized, which, for my purposes here, simply means that they become real. What it means to be real is not something I try to answer here. Nevertheless, there is one effect that I think is worth mentioning: both the real ontology and possible ontologies change. When you actually play your game turn, the state of the board changes, and so do the possibilities. For instance, it is impossible, according to the rules, to repeat the move you have just played.

But if all the moves are equally possible, why play one move rather than another? Most people prefer moves because they view them as more likely to win them the game. More specifically, the current board state determines where certain moves would be more valuable than others. On top of that, experience and knowledge factor in evaluating board state and exploring potential avenues of victory.

All of those factors are currents, the various parameters that determine which possibilities realize, and which do not.

Returning to the example, the fact that Rasha died on Sunday is one current that determined what really happened: if Rasha did not die, the evening would have gone quite differently.

But there is more to the story than that—if nobody told you that Rasha had died, you might have gone on to lecture about your theory. How could you have known not to? We can deduce that your friends telling you about Rasha must have been a current. But even then, you might not have had the sensibility to hold back on explaining. As a result, your sensibility is a current we can add to the model.

And between your friends telling you all this and your sensibilities, you must have had some sort of understanding about what "Rasha died on Sunday" means. Another current. And for you to understand anything, you must have some sort of mind. Another current. And for you to have a mind, you must exist! Another current—

This easily becomes very chaotic. Let us turn to some more concepts to organize this model better…

Current Ontologies

Recall that possibilities are ontologies, which can be thought of as lists of facts.

In a physical ontology, there may be electrons, fields, and forces, among other things. In a metaphysical ontology, which has to do with existence more abstractly, there may be cats,1 philosophy, and friendship, among other things. In an epistemological ontology, which relates to knowledge and understanding, there may be beliefs, concepts, and desires, among other things.

The important principle to understand here is that ontologies play out on their own terms. Take a few examples: electrons create electric fields, which are currents in physical ontologies. People may become friends by doing philosophy together. Those happenings are part of metaphysical ontologies. And desires may turn into beliefs, the dynamics of which can be understood in epistemological ontologies.

Yet, we can understand our states of mind, perhaps belonging to epistemological ontologies, by investigating our brains, which might be said to be part of some neurological ontology. The reason why this works is that we can pull the two into some other ontology, say, a metaphysical one. As interesting as this problem is, it is not the main point of my essay, so I leave it for now.

The important point here is that physical currents play in physical ontologies, epistemic currents play in epistemic ontologies, and so on. To better understand the dynamics of the evening, it will be best to investigate it in some particular ontology.

Let us continue with an epistemic one, and bring our search to a close with simulation.

Simulation

When you hold back from talking about your philosophical discovery, you do so partly because you expect doing so to result in effects you would not like.

In essence, you simulate the scenario. You consider the various epistemic currents people have, like their receptivity to your position, their stress levels, their various beliefs, and so on.

When your friend told you of the passing of Rasha, you ‘updated’ your epistemic ontology, not with the fact that Rasha died on Sunday, but with various beliefs about Rasha, about your friend’s mental condition, about Sunday, and so on. The epistemic currents you assign to other people are updated as well.

As a result, simulating your talking about your philosophy predicts undesirable effects. Talking about your philosophy, then, become very undesirable, so you end up not doing so.

Simulation plays an important role in social interactions. It will be interesting to understand simulation in terms of currents.

In virtue of understanding such social interactions in this way, we gain tools that allow us to navigate social interactions and understand people through their behavior.

And since our simulation is itself effected by various currents we ourselves have, it shines light into the currents we ourselves might be.

Today, I would like to share with you one of the most influential currents in my thought: meaning.

What is the Meaning of Life?

“What is the meaning of life?”

This question is, more often than not, the setup to a punchline. “42!” The question lends itself well to humor, I think, because it is often overly abstract. But the question is of vital importance, and demands concrete answers.

The question, for example, is “what is the point of all of your suffering?” Solid answers to the question help you get through hardship.

Another aspect of the question places the focus more immediately: “why are you doing what you are doing right now?” Fail to consider the question at this scope, and you may find yourself in hard times.

Just like lack of water makes the body deteriorate, lack of thought in this matter can result in a deterioration of selfhood. Indeed, this question is asked most by those in need of an answer, those who have lost touch with who they are.

All of this to say—in what sense could we ask, let alone answer, the question—without understanding what meaning is?

What is Meaning?

My favorite definition of meaning needs some warming up to. First, please consider this scenario:

You are planning a party for 6pm the next day, and you want your friend to come early. “Meet me at my place at 5,” you say.

The next day, you jolt awake to the sound of knocking from the door—it’s your friend.

“What are you doing here so early?”

“What do you mean? You told me to be here at 5.”

“I didn’t mean 5 in the morning! I meant 5 PM!”

Haha. Now, I will change the dialogue just a little bit, but in a way that will not change the meaning of the phrases spoken:

“What are you doing here so early?”

“What did you want to happen? You told me to be here at 5.”

“I didn’t want you to arrive at 5 in the morning! I wanted you to arrive at 5 PM!”

More long-winded and robotic, there are clearly some differences between the two versions of the conversation. Even still, each line means the same thing. How?

Desired Effect

Meaning is the same as desired effect. When your friend asked you what you meant by what you said, they asked you what effects you desired to result from your speech.

Think of effects as the events that took place as a result of some action. Eating a watermelon (92% water), for example, results in the effects of empty watermelon shell and full stomach. And to best understand what I mean by desire, avoid associating it with personality: a lotus plant, without personality, desires water and sunlight.

With that in mind, it is clear that both versions of the example dialogue mean the same, since they both have the same desired effects: your friend, learning why you are mad; and you, having your friend leave and return later.

Now, let us apply this definition of meaning to the question of this essay: What is the meaning of life?

Desiring Life

If meaning is desired effect, “What is the meaning of life?” becomes “What are the desired effects of life?” Phrased in this way, however, meaning as desired effect becomes difficult to accept. Nor is the question clarified very much.

To clarify, let me distinguish between two senses in which the question may be asked.

The first sense of the question is that of purpose. “Why am I alive?” “To what end is my life directed?” This sense of the question has to do with reason for existence, which is to say, with intent, which is to say, with desire.

The second sense is as a different way to ask about what life consists of. Imagine people who would answer the question with, for example, “living, supporting a family, dying.” For these people, the question of the meaning of life is about how one might live.

Yet, while exploring how one might live, people discover the possibilities of life in front of them. They begin to position themselves with respect to the first sense of the question of meaning: “Now that I know I can be free, my purpose is liberty.”

What is the Point?

If you believe in God, a meaning of life is right in front of you: God’s will. Your life is meaningful as the desired effect of God.

I do not believe in God, but I do believe in my meaning of life. Since meaning is desire, I can make my life meaningful by desiring my life in certain ways. I can do so myself; I need not appeal to some external power. Any being who desires themselves creates their own life meaning.

That is the true power of this view of meaning—you are who you want to be. Yet, this is undoubtedly abstract. There is one more point that makes the concept concrete:

The meaning we give to entities in the world influence the ways we see the world, alongside (and especially) the ways we act.

One great example of this influence is the in-group favoritism bias shown in minimal groups. Experiments have shown that people favor other people in the same groups as them, even if the groups are completely arbitrary.1 That is to say, people give more money to certain people just because they perceive them as being ‘on the same team’ as them.

By shaping who you want to be, by shaping how you want the world around you to be, you create ways of seeing the world in new ways. Seeing the world in new ways, new possibilities of action and new currents of action begin to flow.

The meaning of life is whatever you want it to be.

I hope to positively influence those of you who engage with my work. And since your interaction with my work is my desired effect, you are the meaning of my life.

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Imagine what would happen if you discovered that everything was illusory. Having this insight might significantly reduce your suffering, as it does with many Buddhists.

Now, if a waiter asked you what you wanted to eat for breakfast, to be completely truthful, you would have to say “nothing, there is no such thing.” But then you would get hungry. A concerned friend might ask if you are OK, and you would have no choice but to remark that “there is no self to be OK or not OK.”

How silly! Unless you wanted to share your revelatory insight at the cost of your satiety, you should have answered in a way that at least gets you some food. Sure, it would be fitting to write that insight down in a philosophical treatise. But at the restaurant, your waiter does not want to hear it!

Clearly, just because something is true, does not mean it is applicable. You might have truthfully answered the waiter’s question, but did you do so in the way you ultimately would have liked?

This pain-point is the motivation for prompt criteria. If you have been thinking actively, asking and answering questions in the way I recommended, you might have found that same pain-point: some of your answers to individual questions might completely miss the greater point.

Say you were interested in exploring the many avenues in front of you, thinking about the implications of a consequential decision. Wanting to think actively, you wrote down “what is the meaning of life?”

Then, you find an answer that is immediately truthful: “It depends.”

…

So much for your inquiry. While this example is clearly contrived, I have sometimes written down an interesting question only to, a few months later, ignore it because the answer was something obvious along the lines of “it depends.”

To ensure that your questions get the answers you want out of them, keep track of the criteria you will hold various answers to. If your criteria for the waiter’s question was that your answer had to be on the menu, then at the very least, you would not be starving.

I often use Obsidian’s Canvas as a thinking tool. Expect a step-by-step guide sometime, but for now I will use it to visually demonstrate criteria:

Notice the box at the center. It states the problem I had, the prompt at the center of the whole inquiry. In this case, I realized that my understanding of behavior had incompatibilities, so I set out to settle it.

Connected to that central box is a purple box labelled ‘Criteria.’ Within that box are a collection of statements that describe the ideal situation after my thinking is done. Here, I wanted to synthesize the two understandings into a singular view.

While coming up with further questions and answering them, I keep those criteria in mind. They serve as context to which my thinking is directed, making sure that everything is more applicable.

Criteria can really help guide your thinking, but do not treat them as permanent and eternal. It is normal that thinking through something shines light onto what the answer would ideally look like, and criteria in those cases might be too strict.

Unfortunately, criteria take up quite a bit of space. When thinking on chalkboards, I tend to use less criteria because they would not fit. They also take some time, so when I am flooded with ideas I often ignore writing them.

It takes time and practice to discover what works for you, so please think for yourself! Try using criteria in your own thinking, and let me know how it turns out.

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I close my eyes. Opening my awareness, the droning hum of the quiet library makes itself present.

Every quiet has its own sound. This one was interrupted, and I wrote the interruption down. Hearing quiet out is difficult business.

I wonder what my quiet sounds like. Never am I quiet. At least, never to myself. Whenever I talk, I become the elephant in the room. I can feel the blind man gazing uncomfortably, so I tend not to talk. Yet, even when I do not talk, my voice can be heard, tormenting me when I need it least.

A few times a year I remember the quiet-sound of the children’s section of the old Scarsdale public library. I can no longer hear it, and this perhaps makes it quite loud.

Sometimes I hear my quiet. It is a life-affirming sound. Marvelous, tranquil. But it is not really my quiet, is it? It is in any case ungrateful—always is it fleeing when I tell it to stay.

“Music is really life changing,” I notice to myself. “Yes, but in every moment,” I cannot help but clarify.

I can see, when certain tunes play, an island of complete bliss. Sometimes the sound of bliss reaches me, but it might be a siren’s call. In any case, it is a wonderland of pure possibility. Pure, without any actuality.

With this land in my sights, I continue my craft meticulously. Abundantly clear is landing inbound. Yet, inevitably, my creation fails me, and the land too it flees. Oh, so very loud.

It is not surprising to me that God is dead. On too many occasions have I recognized how intricate and masterfully-crafted my own creations are—especially those I fabricated in a hurry.

Have you heard the Ouroboros? You would know what I mean if you have. Who am I kidding, you probably have. Life, after all, is predictable.

“Sacred buildings must have sacred architects,” I think to myself. “Yes, and you know how that makes me feel.” I do. I am beginning to hear my quiet-sound.

Tōru Takemitsu is a great composer. Have you heard Toward the Sea? You would know what I mean if you have. Maybe you have! Life, after all, is full of surprises. And surprises come from the most surprising places.

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In the not-so-distant past, people would think about things, on their own, all the time. If they wanted to know how much time it would take to get to the other side of town, they would not look it up. There was no way to look it up! Instead, they would pull out the maps, contemplate about the methods of transport, make some estimates, and assemble themselves an answer.

Today, you just open Google Maps, set a destination, and read out the time it projects to get there.

This is a good thing. It makes sense to look up facts like the height of the Eiffel Tower. It is simply inefficient and unimportant to calculate those kinds of things yourself. And sometimes it can be harmful if there is too much uncertainty or error in judgement.

But when you seek the answers to questions that have no definite answers, like “what should I do with my life,” what can you do? They are not questions with ‘the correct answer’ available online. The only thing you can do is think for yourself! Of course, you could ask others for guidance as well, but ultimately the hard work falls upon your shoulders.

It is for similar reasons that I, for the past few years, have been increasing the amount of thinking I do for myself. It is surprisingly simple, and I will show you how I do it. But however easy it is to do, it is also astonishingly easy not to do.

Passive Thinking

Many people do not think for themselves. Even in my philosophy classes, congregations of people you would expect to think quite deeply, many people merely read assigned texts and seek to understand the material.

Once they have solid understanding, they regurgitate the written ideas in their predefined orders. In other words, they follow established trails but do not venture into unknown territories nor make their own maps. But this is understandable: thinking for yourself is difficult and painful, so your brain naturally avoids it.

The brain is all about optimizing its efficiency. Since thinking hard uses a lot of energy, it is discouraged if it does not seem worthwhile. Even more disagreeable is the discomfort of uncertainty. We like to have certainty since it comes with safety. Thus, for as long as we are thinking about something, we do not have an answer, we do not have certainty, and we do not have comfort.

So instead of investing all that energy, we usually think passively. Walking around town, I might passively notice a good smell or wonder why a shop is closed. Passive thinking is effortless, unconscious, and without a clear goal in mind. Since it is effortless, it does not require much energy, and as a result it is not discouraged by the brain.

However, while passive thinking is important, thinking for yourself begins with active thinking.

Active Thinking

Active thinking is effortful, conscious, and intentional. Whenever you work on answering a specific question, you partake in active thinking. Recall working on a complicated math problem, and it should be clear that working through such a problem is an effortful and conscious attempt to find answers.

Now, when I urged you to recall working on math problems, you might have recalled getting distracted. Since active thinking is difficult and discouraged by the brain, it is natural to lose concentration and wander off. Then, those passive thoughts take center stage, and active thinking halts.

Many times have I been thinking about something only to wander off in tangent trains of thought. Sometimes that is great, and I have fun with those meanderings. But it is important to stay on topic. A great way to maintain active thinking is to express the thinking.

Thinking through expression, such as writing down a train of thought as it arises, helps in many important ways. Of note, expression creates an artifact of work. Just like building something with your hands, writing thoughts down provides feedback that encourages more work. The feedback loop of adding something and feeling proud of your addition keeps the process going.

And if you get distracted or just cannot keep everything in mind, the artifact can easily bring you up to speed as a base from which to continue.

Below is a real artifact of my active thinking for this essay:

Personally, I always do my active thinking through writing. Most often I write on chalkboards or whiteboards, but sometimes in notes and through writing essays. What is important is to find a method of expression that works for you. After all, thinking for yourself is a highly personal act.

The same flexibility is true of the method I will present to you. I will show you how I think, but you must find out how to make it work for yourself.

Even if you turn it upside down, however, I doubt you will change the fact that it all begins with a concern.

The Method

At the beginning of the method is a concern. To think actively about something, you need something to think actively about. Are you feeling unfulfilled? Do you want to decide whether you should attend an event or not? Would you like to develop a unified theory of everything?

The first step of the method is to express that concern as a question.1 “How can I feel fulfilled?” “Should I attend that event?” “What is the unified theory of everything?”

Putting concerns into words can be very difficult. Do not be discouraged if it does not come naturally at first. It is a skill, so you will get better at it with practice.

Once you have formulated a question, take some time—but not very much time—to let an answer come to you.

This is the stage of the method that takes the most amount of energy and effort. On top of that, since often you will not have an answer, it can be discouraging. It is best to spend very little time here, but this varies from person to person and question to question. I have gotten to the point where I decide whether I have an answer or not while writing down the question.

If an answer came to you, perfect! You have the answer to the question. If not, then begin a miniature version of the method, formulating questions you think might advance the overall question. If your overall question is “what should I eat tonight,” your sub-concern might develop into questions like “what ingredients do I have.” And once you know your ingredients, you will be in a better place to decide what to eat.

At any point where you have an answer to a question, mark that question as done and indicate the answer. Sooner or later, the answer will be in your hands!

To illustrate the method in progress, here is an example I made with Obsidian’s Canvas:

As you can see, I wrote down a few words about my problem. Then, I formulated a question—the box in orange. No answer came to me immediately, so I posed a question I thought might help give me direction. I had an immediate answer, but this also prompted a further question. The cycle continued until I found some answer to the problem in that case, but I did not end up investing enough effort to resolve the original prompt.

The Methodology

There are going to be some aspects of the method I shared that do not work for you. You might find some element missing, or maybe the way I have everything structured does not suit your thinking patterns. Any problem you find, however, is an opportunity for you to figure out a solution for yourself.

See, this is when thinking for yourself becomes important. Everybody is different, and it is the personal particularities that make all the difference. My method will not work perfectly for you. As a result, you must think, not just to find some objective answer that is universally agreed to, but toward a subjective answer. You must think not for anybody else, but for yourself in particular.

With the rise of generative AI, people outsource their thinking more and more. See, before GenAI you would only get the answers you were looking for if they were available online, or if somebody responded to you. After GenAI, and as it continues to improve, on the other hand, you can get an answer to anything you could think to ask.

So it is a valid question to ask: with the advent of GenAI, would it still be worthwhile to think for yourself? The answer is yes, especially since the most important questions, those like How Might One Live, are only meaningful in the sense that a person struggles to work out their personal answers for themselves.

Since ancient times, we humans have distinguished ourselves from other animals through our ability to think. And as we learned that some animals were capable of reason, we maintained our distinction through the quality of our thought.

In a sense, without the ability to think on your own, and without the practice of thinking for yourself, you lose your personality and your particularity. You lose what makes you human and become an animal.

Maintain your humanity by thinking for yourself. It is easy, and I have shown you how.

September 30th, 2023.

A deep exhale. I place the book on the nightstand and fall onto my bed. My eyes look at the ceiling, but I am gazing into another world. Awestruck and giddy, my mind races across pure possibility.

I have just finished reading a life-changing book. This was my third attempt at reading a book throughout the year. The others—bestselling novels—failed to capture my imagination.

The book is Hackett’s Five Dialogues by Plato, the ancient philosopher. I picked it up a month ago, by chance, when I recognized the author’s name on my parents’ bookshelves.

Five Dialogues is a collection of five conversations involving Socrates, Plato’s teacher. It explores concepts of piety, of society, of morality, and of knowledge. But to me, it explored something deeper than any one of those subjects alone.

What I got from this book was an introduction, or rather a re-introduction: this book captivated me more than any novel, not because it brought me into another world, introducing me to its flora, but because it brought me deeper into my own, re-introducing me to the things most familiar.

Crossroads and Connections

Ever since I started coding in elementary school, I was certain that I would be a software engineer. And not just any software engineer, for I would use my programming skills to change the world. In middle school, I made messaging applications. In high school, I built a platform for developers to construct integrated programs. Now that I am in university, I am pursuing a degree in engineering. In other words, I have always been certain of my future.

On September 30th, 2023, I felt an overwhelming urge to drop everything and dive into the wonderful new world that Five Dialogues made possible to explore.

“What if I changed my degree to philosophy?”

The very conceptualization of this possibility drove me insane.

Every minute of my engineering coursework was painfully slow. To me, it was all moot and meaningless, as it seemed that none of it served any real purpose. Compared to my exploration of philosophy in my free time, studying engineering was crossing the Sahara without any water. No, it was even worse than that—I had water, and I could drink it. I was the only one keeping myself from quenching my thirst; I was the only one keeping myself from changing my degree. But at the same time, engineering had always been the plan. Was I about to sever it?

The 19th century philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard must have had my situation in mind when he wrote that

Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom.

This anxiety is a sign of the importance of freedom, of considering how one might live.

Over the past few months, I have been exploring the realm of philosophy in a particular way. I have been interested in the history of philosophy and the various questions people had sought to solve. For the longest time, philosophy could not be regarded as anything other than practical.

Now, however, the public laughs at philosophers. They laugh either because they do not know that ‘philosopher’ is an occupation, or because they have become people who have become aloof in the towers of universities. To me, that is a problem. If philosophy cannot impact the lives of ‘everyday’ people, can it even be called philosophy?

As I developed these concerns, I explored the realm of concepts and their connections to everyday life.

If you are so inclined, you can even track my thinking—Mind as a Figment of Yours is something I wrote while struggling with what exactly philosophy is and with what its purpose might be.

Throughout my thinking and research into these concerns, I realized that one philosopher had already reached many of the same insights I had: Gilles Deleuze.

Deleuze was a complex and complicated thinker. His style of thought was so distinct from others that I needed some sort of introduction to orient myself. So, before diving into his works, I picked up philosopher Todd May’s book Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction.

In his first chapter, May addresses my questions about philosophy and its purpose. He describes Deleuze’s emphasis on philosophy as exploring a question: how might one live?

The Big Question

“How might one live?”

The question, once understood, is clearly an important one. What, after all, is more important to a human being—something that lives—than life?

And by ‘life,’ I do not mean merely the binary condition of being alive or being dead. By ‘life’ I mean our very existence, what we do with it, and its effects on other lives. And I am certain that there are a variety of other aspects that still need to be discovered, analyzed, and lived!

All I’ve said so far is very abstract. What is key is that at the core of the question is its practical manifestation, the one that brings about anxiety. At the core of the question is freedom, as Kierkegaard highlighted. At the core of the question is possibility.

I am sure you, the reader, can relate to Kierkegaard’s sentiment. Let me spell it out with my own case:

My anxiety is caused by my future possibilities of life. If I become an engineer, will I have enough time to read, to think, and to write? Would I be fulfilled?

On the other hand, if I get a degree in philosophy, what will my employment prospects be like down the line? And if I do not find myself a secure job, will I constantly worry about finances?

I am anxious because I am aware of the stakes corresponding to the varying paths in front of me.

But is this anxiety really something to be avoided? Perhaps not!

See, a key point to note is that exploring diverse ways of life broadens horizons. It is exploring the various possibilities of living. Had I not noticed, for example, that there are professors who do philosophy full-time, I would have never considered a route in academia.

In other words, the question “how might one live?” is important.

Indeed, it is so important that it is often the central consideration for the people who change lives. Inventors and entrepreneurs imagine how people might live if some aspect of everyday lives were different, and with those considerations enact the differences through their inventions and products. A human’s life, for example, has completely changed since the invention of smartphones.

On the other side of the same coin, writers and teachers communicate how people might live so that others may explore their own possibilities and strive to fulfill them. Writers might share these paths through creating characters of inspiration, and teachers through demonstrating interesting skills. I learned of my interest in writing, for example, when a kind teacher encouraged me to write in a way I found valuable.

Similarly, philosophers explore how people might live. But what makes them so different from others? After all, many people of other occupations explore the same question, as shown. What sets philosophers apart is that they explore the question itself.

See, if philosophers are very good at one thing, it is questioning the premises of questions! If you ask them whether you should be eating animal products or not, chances are that they will ask you what you mean by “should.”

Yes, the constant questioning can be an annoying trait, I understand. Plato writes about how it even got his teacher, Socrates, killed! But it is also important. Philosophers want to be right about things, at least to the extent they can be. Isn’t that the right thing to do, when somebody genuinely asks for advice?

Philosophers, therefore, question the question of how one might live, revealing that to understand which possibilities are livable, we need to explore what life might consist of.

The story of the Buddha’s path to enlightenment will be a good example here. I present my own rendition:

The Buddha’s Story

Siddhārtha Gautama, the man to eventually become Buddha, was son to King Śuddhodhana. Upon Prince Siddhartha’s birth somewhere between the 6th and 5th centuries B.C.E, his father the king asked an astrologer to predict Siddhartha’s destiny.

Rejoice! Your son, the prince Siddhārtha, is destined to greatness! But the form of this greatness presents itself in one of two opposite ways. For, your majesty, Siddhartha will either become king of the lands as far as the eye can see, or he will become a great spiritual teacher with many followers.

The king, desiring his son to become an even greater king than he was, sheltered his son from the outside world. He kept Siddhartha in a grand palace, with anything he could ever want. If the prince was hungry, the world’s greatest chefs were to at once prepare a grand banquet. If the prince was bored, the best singers and dancers would at once sing and dance.

Over time, however, the prince became unsatisfied. The riches and splendor became old. Eventually, the prince got curious about the world outside his palace walls. How might those people live?

“Bring me into the village, let me make merry with my people,” he told his personal guard. Instructed by the king not to do such a thing, the guard refused. But as the prince pushed and pushed, the guard relented, and they went out to the village.

The prince absorbed the village sights from his carriage. Children at play, young men engaging in discussion, and… a frail figure, limping along the road with the assistance of a cane.

“Guard, who is this man? Why does he behave so?”

“That is an old man, my prince. Age has caught up to him, and has made his body weak.”

“Does age catch up to everybody in this same way?”

“Yes, my prince. Everybody, even you.”

The prince was disturbed by this, but even more curious about what else he could discover in the village.

Not long after passing the old man, the prince saw somebody surrounded by flies and covered in bumps.

“And this person? Guard, what is this person’s condition?”

“That is a sick person, my prince. Sickness has gotten to him and has taken from him his health.”

“Does everybody become sick?”

“Yes, my prince. Everybody, even you.”

This disturbed the prince even more. But, fueled by his curiosity, he ventured further through the village.

When he reached the village outskirts, the prince noticed an immobile figure on the ground.

“Guard, see this person here. Why are they not moving?”

“This is a dead man, my prince. His life is gone, taken away by death.”

“Does everybody die?”

“Yes, my prince. Everybody, even you.”

With this, the prince’s worldview had been transformed. But as much as he was disturbed, he had also made an important discovery: suffering is an inevitable part of life.

“What Is” and “What Might Be”

From this insight into human life, the prince sought after the solutions to suffering. Through further experiences and realizations, the prince understood the solution out of suffering and became the Buddha. His teachings, Buddhism, became the foundational materials for a new possibility of life.

These kinds of realizations are, to me, at the heart of philosophy. When philosophers are not directly exploring how one might live, chances are that their research explores the various elements of living. Philosophy is thus an avenue to investigate questions about what life consists of, unfolding how one might live, and what livable possibilities might be.

A different, but similar aspect of concern for what life consists of is exploring one’s current circumstances. After all, the possibilities that are open for you to live depend greatly on where you are at right now.

But the philosophers are relentless with their questioning! There is one last aspect of the question, yet another aspect that is also vitally important. Exploring what one’s life might consist of involves exploring what that ‘one’ might be. “What is this thing that lives?”

For example, one of the Buddha’s other core insights into existence, one that allows his possibilities of life, is one about what human beings are. Or more precisely, what the self is.

When exploring what one might be, the Buddha realized that there is no enduring self at all; the self is an illusion. However impossible that may seem, this view led the Buddha to revolutionize the way he thought about what people’s lives consisted of. In turn, this realization influenced his advice on how to live; and therefore, on livable possibilities.

Exploring “what is” helps explore “what might be.”

This maxim extends into the realm of other ‘ones’ in our lives. It is not limited to an exploration of yourself as the ‘one,’ or human beings as ‘ones.’ When futurists think about what AI is, for example, their insights inform what they predict the future of AI might hold.

And since our dependence on AI is increasing day-by-day, how we might live in the future is informed by what AI is now. In general, considering what the things around us are helps establish the relationships between those things and our future lives.

For example, if you are an artist or an art lover, your life and possibilities are intertwined with what art is and what its possibilities are. “How might art live?” Is art supposed to be pleasing? Perhaps intriguing? Does a duct-taped banana qualify as art? What are the effects of art on life? It is questions such as these that philosophy seeks to answer.

But what is the big picture here? It is that all of these elements of life, intertwined and interrelating, become our individual lives. Exploring life means exploring these elements.

This sprawling world, teeming with life, is the world into which I was introduced by Plato’s book. The various elements and considerations have always been there, but never before have I actually looked upon them. In this same yet new world, I could see compassion, listen to virtue, and feel reason in my hands. The invisible forces at play in our world are expressed in full color through philosophy.

I call this world the world of “immanence.” Through Immanent Essays, I will be your tour guide through this kaleidoscopic world, showing you the various landmarks that influence my own journey and may influence yours.

The question of the essay, “How might one live,” does not have a definite answer. There is no conclusion, nothing that resolves the question “once and for all.” All that we can do in response to the question is explore and keep on exploring.

It is my hope and pleasure that you will join me in this journey of exploration.

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I will begin by defining what I mean by “ways of thinking about free will” with the use of agent perspectives. I will then show how agent perspectives play with expectation, which is at the core of attachment and detachment. Attachment and detachment are themselves central to dissonance and consonance, terms for suffering and well-being, which in turn have causal effects on behavior.

This is another essay I wrote for a class on the Philosophy of Mind. I believe that it is the clearest among the three academic essays I have published here so far. There is yet another aspect that differentiates this essay from those other two. Both Mind as a Figment of Yours and Shuzan’s Shippé deal with meaning and concepts, but this essay deals with attachment, dissonance, and behavior.

I will be writing more on dissonance, on attachment (and detachment), and on behavior. To be notified when those essays are published consider subscribing!

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Returning to the essay proper…

Views on free will have effects on agent perspectives, where agent perspectives are the ways people see themselves in situations relating to free will. With regard to the various views on the matter, people typically fall into one of three groups: libertarian, determinist, or compatibilist1. One key difference between philosophical views and agent perspectives is that while philosophical views are thought about abstractly, agent perspectives are reflections on particular situations. For example, a libertarian might see their own history of addiction and believe that they have control over what happens next. Such a perspective frames the self as a subject, as an actor in control of some of the events they encounter. I call it the subjective perspective. The objective perspective, in contrast, relates to a determinist’s outlook on their situation: “this addiction is controlling me and I cannot escape it.” It is marked by framing the self as an object, onto which events occur, the self without control.

What about compatibilism? A compatibilist may take a more nuanced view when considering things in abstract, but in real situations, they take on a certain perspective. Agent perspectives are not philosophical views, but down-to-earth frames of mind, dealing with particular circumstances, tied with concepts from free will.

So how does all this relate to the concepts of attachment, detachment, and expectation? Shifting between the perspectives discussed above is the same as attaching or detaching. To understand attachment or detachment, understanding expectation is key.

An expectation is an ardent desire that involves an inclination towards fulfilling that desire. This inclination naturally develops into desire to be in control of the situation.2 Humans fundamentally desire control3, which is why there is often an expectation to be in control. All of this talk about control brings something to mind, right? The perspective of being in control, of course, is the subjective perspective. Therefore, expectation is linked to the subjective perspective.

One key point of note is that people change which perspective they use to view particular situations all the time, compatibilists and incompatibilists alike. Just because somebody is a hard determinist does not mean that they see every situation from an objective perspective. Now, it has been established that the subjective perspective is linked with expectation, and the objective perspective is not.

What is meant by attachment is simply the act of expecting, while detaching is letting go of such expectations. In other words, and to reiterate, attaching is the shifting from the objective to the subjective perspective, while detaching is the shifting from the subjective to the objective perspective. Attachment and detachment are thus linked to views on free will. Great, but what does this all have to do with well-being?

Suffering, and by extension well-being, has to do with expectation. In particular, it has to do with a disconnect between expectation and realization, or a lack thereof. The specific type of ‘suffering’ I am talking about is dissonance, a tension of ‘wrongness.’ This term is borrowed from cognitive dissonance, and can be seen as a different interpretation of the concept. Dissonance is the tension that occurs in a subject when they perceive that something is wrong within them, or within the world. ‘Wrong’ here denotes ‘against the held worldview,’ so that dissonance is the tension due to a broken worldview. This is similar to the original ‘cognitive’ dissonance, which has to do with holding contradicting beliefs. Having a broken worldview, or even more extravagantly having ‘your world crumble around you’ is not likely to contributes to well-being. Hence, well-being requires the lack of dissonance. To make the concept of dissonance a bit clearer, consider an example:

Sarah thinks of herself as fit and athletic. She was on a sports team in high school and has maintained this view of herself after graduating. She decides to go for a run, and upon realizing that she runs out of breath quickly nowadays, senses that something is wrong. She understands that she is athletic, but now she is presented with evidence that she is not. This tension between her simultaneous beliefs that she is athletic and that she is not athletic is dissonance, causing her suffering.

Where in the formulation does expectation and realization fit? There is an alternative way of looking at dissonance, or at the very minimum an alternative way of looking at how it forms: dissonance as an awareness of a gap between expectation and realization. Realization is a perception of the way things are, while expectation is an belief that things are a certain way now, or will be a certain way in the future. When things do not unfold in the ways that we want them to, we get hurt! That is also dissonance.

Expectations, which bring about dissonance, and therefore hurt well-being, are the defining factors of attachment and detachment. Attaching, since it involves more expecting, hurts well-being, while detachment at minimum prevents dissonance. Keeping in mind that shifting agent perspectives is attachment and detachment, shifting also causes suffering and well-being. And what affects the agent perspectives relied on? Philosophical views on free will. The picture comes together: philosophical views on free will, particularly libertarian ones, cause suffering! Yet, there is one more almost-paradoxical part of the puzzle.

As established by cognitive sciences, we do whatever we can to get rid of dissonance.4 Dissonance is a force like hunger and thirst. Just like we have a drive to satiate our hunger and quench our thirst, we have a drive to resolve our dissonance. The drive to resolve dissonance could result in different attempts at resolving it. One common attempt is to become distracted, so that the awareness wanes and realization is dissipated. After all, dissonance requires awareness, so being shielded from the world by doom-scrolling on social media is often one attempt to distract and resolve dissonance. Another way of resolving dissonance is to take action to work towards the expectation: If Sarah, from the example above, realizes that she is not the athlete she thinks she is, she might be urged to start exercising regularly. This is how behavior is affected by dissonance, though not exclusively by dissonance. Following the chain of argument, philosophical views concerning free will cause this kind of behavior, the kind of behavior that is done in reaction to dissonance.

One might claim that this kind of ‘dissonant’ behavior constitutes only a marginal amount of behavior, and I believe this claim is true: much more of our behavior is autonomous, like the beating of our heart or the regulation of body temperature. External things as well can be autonomous, like habits and associated movements like walking, and even passively sensing. What is interesting is the balance of dissonant and voluntary behavior. I will not complicate this paper with more definitions, but consider how many times in a day you really think through consequences of things with a clear mind. Those are the only times you engage with volition. Every other behavior is autonomous, or else it is dissonant. Therefore, much of life is lead by dissonance.

I mentioned that there would be an almost-paradoxical element, and it is this: libertarianism leads to dissonance, which affects behaviors in particular ways. Such behavior, however, is not necessarily performed fully under free will; some part of the behavior is determined by the nature of the dissonance taking place. That seems to count against libertarianism in the first place! This isn’t a strong argument, but I think it might be some food for thought.

Ways of thinking about free will have effects on well-being and behavior. This is because ways of thinking about free will have effects on agent perspectives ( reflections of situations relating to free will). These perspectives are (a) the subjective perspective with an assumption of control, of will; and (b) the objective perspective with an assumption of determinism. When shifting agent perspectives, dissonance can appear or disappear, mediated through expectation, which is an ardent desire involving control. This expectation factors into dissonance as awareness of a gap between expectation and realization. Dissonance hurts well-being, and we do what we can to get rid of dissonance. All of these relations, but particularly the relations between free will, well-being, and behavior, will continue to be debated and expounded due to the importance of the question and the prevalence of schools of thought with different answers to the question. What I think may be equally as important, however, is bringing back to philosophy an engagement with the human condition, in a way that connects it to various aspects of everyday experience. It isn’t often that we experience “free will,” but what is certain is our experience of suffering.

Shuzan held up his shippé, and said, “You monks! If you call this a shippé you omit its reality. If you don’t call it a shippé, you go against the factuality. Tell me, all of you, what will you call it?”

首山和尚,拈竹篦示衆云,汝等諸人,若喚作竹篦則觸,不喚作 竹篦則背. 汝等諸人,且道喚作甚麽.

So goes the 43rd case of the Mumonkan,1 a 13th century collection of Zen koans compiled by and commentaries written by a monk by the name of Mumon. I use the case as a tool in arguing for the following: Philosophy, defined loosely as any inquiry into singular, foundational truth, is misguided. Not only is such a singular foundational truth incoherent, it can also be a harmful heuristic that obscures insight instead of revealing it.

This essay was written for a class on Current Continental Philosophy. That class was my target audience, so I will now provide a few words to aid the reader without experience in academic philosophy: I develop a view throughout the essay I call “phenomenological pragmatism.” Phenomenology, as I use the term, has to do with focusing on what is experienced, as opposed to focusing on what is theorized. Pragmatism refers to my focus on ‘meaning’ rather than ‘truth.’ Thus, my view can be described as “focusing on the meaning of things experienced.”

If you find this essay interesting, or if you cannot make heads-or-tails of it, please stick around—I will write more about these concepts in more detail, in a more accessible way, and in a more social way. Consider subscribing so that you get notified when I publish those!

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Back to the essay…

The word shippé,2 the way we use words together, and really the vast majority of the language we use, is not completely under our control. Jacques Derrida describes this condition in his “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” as a state “of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it were from the very beginning at stake in the game.”3 Mumon describes these stakes in his commentary on the koan, proclaiming that “lifting up the bamboo staff is an order giving life or taking it away.”4 It is not just spoken and written language, but the ways in which the world operates that are out of our control. Our life and death literally depend on the ‘rules’ of the world, and Derrida is right to say that this makes us anxious.5 From this anxiety, we try to make as much sense of the world as we can with what we have.6 This sense-making gives us respite and is most comforting when asserted as certain, foundational truth.

Philosophy traditionally involves that same sense-making, that search for certain, foundational truths, that search for foundational reality. Unfortunately, something is amiss. Derrida points out that philosophy is conducted through language, which is to say through signifiers. Signifiers, for Derrida, are all that are needed for language. The meaning of signifiers does not come from signs, which involve some intrinsic relation with a signified, as had been previous thought by structuralists following Ferdinand de Saussure.7 After showing the sign to be incoherent, Derrida demonstrates that “the absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the interplay of signification ad infinitum”.8 The signifier “shippé” is not intrinsically linked somehow to some signified shippé of Shuzan. Instead, the meaning is a complicated network of presence and absence. Particularly, the meaning of every signifier is constituted by its complement.9

Given this, truth, reality, and Being, are constituted by their complements: non-truth, non-reality, and non-Being. But then in what sense, if they have more foundational parts, are these concepts of truth, reality, and Being, foundational? “The paradox,” Derrida expressed in the context of signs, was that “the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing.”10 Philosophy then seeks foundational reality but will never be able to reach it since there is no single foundational signifier. This insight “undercuts the project of philosophical foundationalism, the project of building a final and unsurpassable foundation for thought.”11

Furthermore, reality is not the reality we think it is. More accurately, more perplexingly, reality is the reality we think it is, but it is only that, not something else. It is just what we think it is—our stories of it. But that makes it somehow not that reality, perhaps out there, that we think it is. For example, what could you say in consideration of your phone? What can you say about it that is not your interpretation? Nothing, since anything you could say has to be said, and said by you. Your phone is nothing but what you think of it. You could resist this notion by appealing to some phone ‘out there,’ separate from you, and asserting that it has some relation to you that grants it the status of being yours. In that case, you could insist that your phone really does exist in a manner separate from you. Even if you are correct and there is such a phone, any way you conceptualize it would be through your interpretations, simply because it is you who is doing so. But in the end, even that abstract phone and its mysterious relation to you could not exist purely on its own, since the terms used in proposing such a situation are linked to your language, to your other interpretations. The signifiers ‘phone,’ ‘relation,’ and even ‘you’ are all given meaning through your own network of signifiers. Your phone is your interpretation, or as Nietzsche put it, “there are no facts, only interpretations.”12

This is how we ‘omit reality’ when calling Shuzan’s shippé a “shippé.” But it’s also missing the point to avoid calling it a shippé altogether… and what a predicament you would be in if you couldn’t call a shippé a shippé! It’s evidently useful.

If the traditional concepts of foundational truth and of foundational philosophy are no longer tenable, what can replace them? As an example, what happens to statements like “the mind is completely mental,” as is sometimes claimed by philosophers of mind? What replaces such statements are methods that avoid letting such statements become totalizing, which would have them take on some foundational role. The techniques to prevent this come from two sources, one pragmatist and one pluralist. The pragmatist technique is to push further into the meaning of the statement in situations, so that it becomes meaningful in a network of meaning.13 The fact that the mind is mental, for example, might play an important part in an argument. The pluralist technique is to avoid being limited by this single interpretation, and instead be open to statements like “the mind is partially physical.”14 The result of this approach is a kind of pluralist pragmatism, where multiple interpretations are employed in different scenarios where they might fit best. If phenomenology is about focusing on ‘the things themselves’, this pragmatism is about focusing on ‘the interpretations themselves.’ If an interpretation is a ‘thing,’ then this approach may be called phenomenological pragmatism.

Indeed, pragmatic approaches are good alternatives when foundationalist truth is incoherent. But even if it were coherent, phenomenological pragmatism as an approach brings about more insight. A simple example from high school chemistry is the use of the Bohr model in teaching about the atom. Scientific consensus is that the Bohr model is overly simplified and does not hold truth. Yet, it is a source of insight into learning more about the atom, one that is still used today, even compared to models that might be ‘more true.’

The example provided, however, only demonstrates that foundational truth is not necessary for insightful models. To show that foundational truth would actually harm the picture consider the most accurate model of the atom taught in high school:15 the quantum model. By ‘accurate’ here I mean the least error-prone as is understood within the bounds of science.

Using this model might lead to better results than using the Bohr model, since it is more accurate. Unfortunately, this benefit comes at the cost of there being fewer opportunities to use the model in the first place: the Bohr model makes many meaningful claims, more than the quantum model does. It thus has more chances at being shown wrong—but that itself is an insight!

Another sense in which phenomenological pragmatism reveals more than foundational truth is in the ways interpretations interact with each other. Somebody in the latter camp may make a claim like “physicalism is true,” whereas the pragmatist, who cannot make such a strong truth claim, might say “physicalism is the only theory that accounts for the correspondence between brain and mind states.” If these sentences were answers to somebody’s question about physicalism, the pragmatist’s answer is clearly more informative, more insightful.

In some sense, it doesn’t really matter that I’m not being ‘completely truthful’ or ‘omitting reality’ when calling the shippé “a shippé” since it helps me talk about it.

Destabilizing a singular truth of the matter seems awfully relativist, doesn’t it? Anything could be true, so I can go around saying anything I want, without regard to what others say. But that anything can be true or not is not important to phenomenological pragmatism, since truth itself is not what is important. Truth is not on its own meaningful. Furthermore, proofs, which illustrate the components of an interpretation, become more important since understanding interpretations pragmatically puts the emphasis not on the ‘accuracy’ of the interpretation, but on the interplay of the interpretation with other interpretations, like highlighting where exactly there are contradictions and keeping them in mind.

When somebody makes a claim, a relativist might be forced to accept it, but a phenomenological pragmatist can ask “why,” and “what do you mean,” and have reasoned arguments. On the flip side, the approach somehow makes other non-traditional modes of doing philosophy, like poetry, music, and visual arts, more legitimate and important. Propositional statements, since they are all about asserting truth, become ever so slightly less superior over forms that express less assertive notions, since interpretation and meaning becomes important.

The pluralistic and pragmatic answer to Shuzan is to call the shippé “a shippé” when it seems suitable, and not call it “a shippé” when that seems suitable. I will not miss the reality, but nor will I miss the factuality. That might not seem very philosophically sophisticated, but there is a reason why this Koan is part of a highly respected text in Zen traditions, traditions sought after by practically minded people, and enticing to high-minded academics. One of the biggest insults philosophers can give each other is a simple “oh, that’s interesting,” or “that sounds about right.” This Koan serves as a reminder that good philosophy has staying power, disturbs us, and changes our sense of meaning, if not our lives. “The soul becomes dyed with the color of its thoughts,” says Marcus Aurelius.16 Let us do philosophy that benefits our souls.

This is an essay I wrote for a class on the Philosophy of Mind. It is my first philosophical essay,1 and it outlines some aspects of my approach. To be honest, this essay is not organized well. I use a lot of terms before explaining what they mean, if I explain at all.

I structured the essay around questions. I begin with the question of “how are we able to talk about books without having a good definition of one?” From there, I seek answers. I find more questions, seek more answers, more questions, more answers, and so on. My expectation when writing this was that the reader would take time to contemplate the questions I raise, coming up with assent or objections. “This would orient them to the direction I am headed, so that we would take this journey of exploration together.”

To best experience this essay, please take the time to contemplate my questions.

If you find this essay interesting, or if you cannot make heads-or-tails of it, please stick around—I will write more about these concepts in more detail and with greater accessibility. Consider subscribing so that you get notified when I publish those!

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Back to the essay…

I know what a book is. Precisely? No, probably not, but I can tell you if something is a book or not. Well, if you hand me a long scroll with the contents of a short book, I might have a hard time deciding whether it is one or not. I know of a few ways in which it is like a book, and a few ways it isn’t. I am able to tell you these things because books are meaningful to me; I just about know what you mean when you talk to me about books. We can generally agree on what are and aren’t books, how we interact with them, and how they interact with us. But how are we able to talk about books without having a good definition of one? After all, books come in many different colors and sizes, different languages and sometimes none at all, and they can even be digital. As a result of the fact that I cannot really tell you what makes something a book by identifying the necessary and sufficient properties of books, it should be something else, not something intrinsic to the thing itself, that gives me knowledge of books. What is that something else?

Rather than receiving that knowledge, I constructed it. When I learned the word ‘book,’ I looked at such ‘books’ and recognized them as such. The alphabet book, the bedtime storybook, etc. Reflectively, it seems like this meaning of what a book is derives from my associating of things as books. As a subject begins to associate composites of particulars of their experience with each other, those composites become abstracted as particulars of experience themselves, and, as a result, concepts are formed. To remove any implication on anything ‘out there,’ experience here is completely phenomenal. It includes illusion and hallucination. A ‘particular of experience’ is anything experienced as meaningfully distinct, as I can distinguish the books on my bookshelf from each other. But what is ‘meaning?’ I can get meaning from a sentence, so that I can read books and understand them. While driving, if I see an octagonal red sign, I will come to a stop; the sign is meaningful. Meaning is, for a subject, the effect anything has on that subject’s actions and experiences, for instance how books are meaningful to me as things to read. Now, what is a concept? Looking at the things I call concepts, like ‘book’ and ‘car,’ they are ways I divide up the world. A concept is an abstraction of particulars of experience, as I recognize each distinct book on my bookshelf as a ‘book’. Ok, so what about composites of those particulars? Composites of particulars are nothing more than the individual particulars, until they are associated and form meaning as a whole. It is in this way that my edition of Non-physical theories of consciousness2 has meaning, and it is in this way that my concept of ‘book,’ in general, has meaning.

But if all it takes to be a book is for me to arbitrarily decide so, what do I make of things of which I have not yet made an arbitration? Surely it isn’t completely arbitrary! Experience says otherwise—I can tell you some general characteristics of a book: some assortment of text combined sequentially. It is in my recognition of this that I am able to reason through the book-ness of things. The associations a subject makes between composites of particulars of experience are actually associations of isomorphisms, a term for when the particulars of the composite can themselves be associated3. A long scroll can connect in meaning to a book through some of its similar structure: it is made of paper, it can be held, it can be read, etc. The concepts ‘made-of-paper,’ ‘holdable,’ and ‘readable’ are recognized between the two.

So then, what is a mind? Just like a book is meaningful as a book in terms of the concept of ‘book,’ a mind is meaningful as a mind in terms of the concept of ‘mind.’ A specific book title may jump out at me, and that specific title is not part of my concept of book, so a book can be meaningful in ways other than its meaning as a book, like in relation to other concepts, or in pre-conceptual association with isomorphisms. The same is true of minds; though it may be more difficult to experience particulars of minds. Great, but what is the point? The point is realizing that minds are not primarily things external to us, but that minds are primarily things internal, and only secondarily external. The point is being able to examine the various theories of what minds are, and realizing what is really going on when one theory sounds unappealing. Is it really that it seems false, or does it use a concept of mind with meanings inconsistent with yours? … Oh, you really think that it isn’t true, huh. Then I ask you, what is truth? What does it mean for something to be the case?

In everyday life we talk about things being the case all the time: “rest days are great,” “there is class,” “I am late.” In each of these cases there is an appeal to being: ‘are,’ ‘is,’ ‘am.’ That is no problem for getting around, but in philosophy, that poses quite a metaphysical problem! How can we know about reality without knowing what reality is4? Hold on—there are two problems here. For one, we do seem to know about reality, evident in that we have ‘no problem getting around.’ For another, it seems that what we would want to look for is something about what reality is, what being is, what is is. Evidently, we won’t be able to define the being of being, as any attempt to define being would rely on a definition of being5.

Those two problems can be resolved by realizing that reality, or being, is also a concept. I am, my books are, this paper is. A subject abstracts the concept of being from the particulars which are meaningful as being. But then, when I am talking about a book, am I really talking about something that exists? That is real? Well, yes, since what it means for something to exist and be real depends on your own conception of existence and reality. “No, I mean ‘out there.’ Does the book exist objectively?” Well, if ‘out there’ includes somebody else’s conception of the book, then maybe it does. Even if nobody is around to have concepts of the book, maybe it exists, who’s to say? It seems like that book may indeed exist outside my concept of it, and maybe not.

But isn’t that book something that I made up, through my own associations of isomorphisms, into my own concepts? I’ve already said that it isn’t that book that makes it that book, so how can that book be that book in itself? Anything I think might exist objectively is intrinsically subjective. And I am still thinking that things can be, but have already seen how being is a concept, and thus created as well. It is definitely influenced by the way other people use the terms I associate with the concept ‘being,’ but then it is socially created rather than personally created. Great, but what is the point? The point this time is to realize what it means to agree and disagree with different philosophical views. It isn’t so much that I like the representational theory of mind, which is physicalist, because I think it is more ‘real,’ but because they nest better in my web of concepts. I am able to see the many ways in which thinking of the mind like that has benefits, such as in understanding how meaning can possibly connect to a mechanical world. But I am also able to see the ways in which dualism, which makes the mind mental, can help me think about the ‘concepts’ and ‘thoughts’ and ‘experiences’ as mental states that I have, all without referring to the syntactic manipulation of other theories, as is the case in the representational theory.

Why limit my experience and understanding of mind by some made-up concept of truth and reality? Thinking that a theory is false outright is different from understanding how a theory is incompatible with other immanent understanding, like understanding how exactly Searle’s Chinese Room refutes the representational theory of mind. I’ll introduce nuance into my conceptual map by de-emphasizing my concept of truth, and prioritizing the pragmatic merit of a plurality of perspectives. Holding this plurality of perspectives, even if they are contrary to each other, can (and has, in my experience) enable bigger and greater interaction with other concepts and pre-concept meaning: there is a greater pool of isomorphisms to associate. Even those theories which outright deny the mind, like the identity theory which states that the mind is equivalent to the brain, may be fruitful to hold, while simultaneously holding idealist theories in which everything is mental. The value of truth is that it is objective and eternal. Upon realizing that it is subjective and circumstantial, as I have argued, all we are left with is pragmatism.

“Hold on, how can two contradicting views be held simultaneously?” That seems impossible, or at least irrational. But contradicting views are often held—for example, classical mechanics describes a world of physics in a way that does not work on the quantum scale, and quantum theories don’t work on the classical scale. Physicists clearly understand and utilize them. Having both theories in mind is useful not only in helping describe the world meaningfully, but also in enabling interactions between the theories and the other concepts held; increasing the explanatory power of the conceptual map. Clearly, this isn’t irrational, but the criticism stands that these two theories aren’t really being “held simultaneously:” one is used when the other fails. Now consider an example—If you think there is a 60% chance of rain tomorrow, you simultaneously think, in a sense, that it is going to rain tomorrow and you think that it isn’t going to rain tomorrow. This nuanced view embraces what appears to be a contradiction, but it really isn’t a contradiction because neither conjunct is taken as ‘completely true.’ A contradiction has to involve incompatible statements of truth. For example, holding it to be completely true that it will rain tomorrow, and that it will not rain tomorrow. Or, when the credences are incompatible, such as thinking that there is a 60% chance of rain, and a 60% chance of not-rain. Remember, however, that truth is made up—it is a concept that hides what is really going on in concept-meaning interactions. Without any appeal to some objective truth, there is no contradiction.

Another criticism concerns the issue of arguing against the reality of mind through the use of ‘meaning’ and ‘concept.’ The problem with this criticism is that for it to hold, ‘meaning’ and ‘concept’ need to be real, while the mind unreal. However, ‘meaning’ and ‘concept’ are themselves concepts, which aren’t necessarily real. In any case, what it means to be real isn’t clear at all. The arguments I make needn’t be ‘true’ or match up with ‘reality,’ but be meaningful to those who understand them. This meaning interacts with the other meaning people have, enriching the reality that a person creates. The point is not primarily to be correct, but primarily to make an impact, so that people can question and figure out what being ‘correct’ means.

‘Mind’ is a concept, which is meaning. As meaning, it is able to interact with whatever it means to philosophize about the mind. ‘Reality’ is also a concept, and as such is able to interact with the other concepts we have. A rich network of meaning becomes richer with more interpretations of ‘mind,’ and adopting such interpretations is possible once realizing that ‘truth’ is limiting. The mind is physical, mental, both, and neither—not because those are ‘true,’ but because they are meaningful together.

Images from Clear Shadows (1867).

Mr. Kaninchente: Good day! Ah, I know you two—Alice and Hugo, are you not?

Hugo: Hello sir. I’m not Alice, I’m Hugo.

Alice: And I’m not Hugo, but Alice.

Mr. Kaninchente: And I’m Mr. Kaninchente, but please call me Mr. K. I’ve heard that you two are quite knowledgeable, so I’d like to ask you a question.

Alice: Please, we love questions!

Mr. Kaninchente: Wonderful. What do you think I am? Of course, you two are human. With me, things are less cut-and-dry. A bit more fused-and-wet, shall we say?

Belief and Disagreement

Hugo: Doesn’t seem that way to me, Mr. K. You are quite obviously a rabbit! Clear as day.

Alice: Clear as mud! Mr. K is a duck. See: that is his beak, those are his head-feathers.

Mr. Kaninchente: I see. One of you believes I am a rabbit, and the other a duck. With such different answers, how can you be so sure?

Hugo: I believed your duck-ness pretty strongly, but after hearing Alice point out another possibility, honestly, I can only be a little less confident in my own hypothesis.

Alice: As for me, I will do no such reduction. I even pointed out the reasons for my hypothesis, you will recall.

Hugo: I’ve got reasons too—I just didn’t express them! Where you see a beak I see ears, and where you see feathers I see a snout.

Mr. Kaninchente: Perhaps, to convince each-other or find a different answer altogether, you must both consider additional justifications.

Alice: I agree. Let us continue our walk, and discuss in the meanwhile.

Mr. Kaninchente: Mind if I walk alongside?

Alice and Hugo: Not at all!

Alice: What is to my right, Hugo?

Hugo: A pond.

Alice: What animals would you expect to find in or around a pond?

Hugo: Frogs, fish, ducks… I think I see where you are going with this.

Alice: You wouldn’t expect to find rabbits near a pond, right?

Hugo: No, I wouldn’t.

Alice: Since we’re more likely to find a duck than a rabbit at a pond, and we are at a pond, Mr. K is more likely to be a duck than a rabbit. Case closed.

Hugo: I don’t believe so. Even if your justification is true, it’s not so relevant to our situation. After all, Mr. K can talk! He’s a classic case of an outlier.

Alice: Well, Mr. K? What’s the truth?

Truth and Knowledge

Mr. Kaninchente: That is what I would like to know, Alice. Both of you either believe I am a duck or a rabbit, but I am not so sure myself.

Hugo: How do you mean?

Mr. Kaninchente: I’ve asked human biologists, you see. They recalled and applied their definitions—I didn’t fit the definition of either animal, so they deemed me to be neither. I myself tend to identify as both! After all, I am both rabbit-like and duck-like.

Alice: Then what’s the truth? The biologists understand it one way, Hugo and I another two ways, and Mr. K yet a fourth.

Hugo: Hmm. When you made your case for Mr. K’s duck-ness, my picture of the situation got clearer. What is that, if not getting closer to the truth? Perhaps the truth is simply what is believed the most.

Alice: Now that does not sound right at all. Truth is the fact of the matter, not some opinion, no matter how convincing.

Hugo: Would it be right to call that knowledge?

Alice: No. Answer me this: if there were no humans, would planet Earth still be round?

Hugo: Certainly.

Alice: That is a fact of the matter. It doesn’t depend on any human. But to know that the Earth is round requires a knower.

Hugo: So knowledge requires somebody to do the knowing.

Alice: Correct. The real question is, what could we know, and how?

Doubt

Hugo: I am intrigued by that question. What are we sure of? I, for one, am sure that I woke up this morning. On the right side of the bed, too!

Alice: Another question: if you woke up, you wouldn’t currently be dreaming, correct?

Hugo: Certainly. And if I didn’t wake up, I would be dreaming. But I distinctly remember waking up, so I’m not dreaming.

Alice: I wouldn’t be so sure—haven’t you dreamt of waking up before?

Hugo: I have, in fact. Quite surreal.

Alice: If you think you are awake because you remember waking up, but also remember waking up within a dream, can you really say that you know you’re awake?

Hugo: I suppose that believing I’m awake just because I remember waking up doesn’t hold water.

Alice: Right. More generally, since you could dream of many things, just because you notice them doesn’t mean they actually exist.

Hugo: Well, then what can I be sure of? I’ve dreamt of many things, after all.

Alice: I know of one thing I can be completely sure of: my experience. Maybe what I experience doesn’t exist at all as I think it does, but I cannot doubt having the experience. I’m not so sure about anything else.

Mr. Kaninchente: But surely you, like I, know I exist?

Alice: Honestly, not quite. Like Hugo, I could be dreaming. I don’t have complete certainty that you exist outside my experience. That being said, I believe in your existence.

Hugo: How could that be? Isn’t that contradictory, believing that you don’t know if he exists or not, and believing that he does?

Alice: While I have reasons to doubt it most fundamentally, I have much stronger justification for believing in Mr. K’s existence.

Hugo: Most intriguing. I see that if knowledge involves truth, the only way we’d know things is if we don’t doubt the knowledge, and that it is true.

Alice: Otherwisely put, a proposition is known to us if we don’t doubt it, and it is true.

Hugo: How do we know if it is true, though? If we don’t know that our undoubtful belief is true, we can’t be sure that it is indeed knowledge.

Alice: Why not consider an example? What about matters like 1 + 1 = 2 where we can surely know it is true? As you mentioned, I don’t doubt this, and it seems obviously true.

Hugo: Good observation. I suppose in this case, since we can know that it is true, this can be knowledge.

Alice: Alright, another thing to add to the list!

Hugo: However, it is true in a different sense: a truth defined by mathematics. The entire truth of the matter is in our heads!

Location of Truth: The Barrier of Experience

Alice: Otherwisely put, in our experience. I see.

Hugo: Absolutely. I’d say we can only know of knowledge whose truth is determined within our experience.

Alice: On the other hand, knowledge whose truth is external to experience is unknowable?

Hugo: I don’t know if I’d go that far. That could be problematic. At minimum, we don’t know it.

Alice: Oh, right! If we said that we couldn’t know anything to be knowledge other than knowledge whose truth is determined by experience, that itself would be a claim of knowledge about knowledge external to experience. It’s self-refuting.

Hugo: Quite astute.

Alice: Thank you.

Hugo: Of course. Now, to consider a truth of the external variety: when I say that this pond contains water, I am appealing to a truth of the matter external to me, right?

Alice: Right.

Hugo: I can’t really know that, however, since I can doubt that it contains water.

Alice: I’ve got an observation that will muddy the water.

Hugo: Really? What is it?

Alice: If you define “water” to be “that which is in the pond,” don’t you know that the pond has water? This is still a truth external to experience, is it not?

Hugo: Yes, but I don’t think you’d want to say that—see, what if there is nothing in the pond at all?

Alice: Oh, I didn’t think of that. But I’m sure some amendment could be made to hammer the same nail.

Hugo: There too will be trouble. Even if there had to be something there, by defining water to be what is in the pond, my assertion would be completely different.

Mr. Kaninchente: What do you mean by different?

Hugo: I would no longer be talking about the water of my experience, so while perhaps I know this to be true, it doesn’t mean anything to me.

Alice: I see. Experience must be crucial to this picture. And I am pretty certain about my experience—it would be quite troubling if I can’t even know that.

Hugo: You can’t doubt it, that’s for sure. I suppose all the examples we’ve seen where the truth of the matter lies outside experience, but is still meaningful inside experience, I, for one, could doubt.

Alice: Right. We agree that either of us cannot even imagine not experiencing. Or, for that matter, not existing, in some shape or form.

Hugo: Yes.

Alice: Of course, I could not do anything, including experiencing, if there were no I.

Mr. Kaninchente: I think, therefore I am—Descartes1.

Hugo: Yes, but can I really be sure that I know that I exist? How do I know that it is true that I exist? Just because I don’t doubt it, and don’t see how I could, can I really say that it must be true?

Mr. Kaninchente: All of this talk seems quite obtuse. Bringing it down to earth, what does this say about what I am?

Alice: It means, like the example with the pond, that if we were to define the concepts of rabbits or ducks such that they apply to you tautologically, we would have a hard time relating that meaningfully to our usual concepts of rabbits and ducks.

Mr. Kaninchente: Okay. This would be like saying “rabbits are what I am,” but this wouldn’t really help in the way I was seeking—I wouldn’t want that.

Alice: Quite so. If, on the other hand, we were to somehow find a perfect definition of “rabbit,” we could easily test that definition on you to see if it applies. Same with “duck.”

Mr. Kaninchente: Oh, I see.

Hugo: Not so fast. Even in this case, how could we easily test you for the definition?

Alice: Well, maybe not easily-

Hugo: Say the definition requires that you have two ears. How could we be sure that you do? In this case we would have to test that as well, using another definition that presumably depends on other tests, and so on, until it results in something we know for sure.

Alice: Huh. Seems like we have to begin with some knowledge in order to test the definitions, if we had them.

Hugo: Yes, but that knowledge couldn’t be of something within our experience, since if it were, it wouldn’t be about Mr. K.

Alice: Doubtlessly.

Hugo: However, if it were from outside the experience, it wouldn’t really mean much to us.

Alice: True, but only if the external knowledge we could have are those which are uninformative, like the pond containing whatever the pond contains.

Mr. Kaninchente: This, if not clearly indicative that knowledge is largely impossible to know, demonstrates that attempting it is quite terrible: it makes no sense to me that I am not talking to you two.

Hugo: I might agree.

Mr. Kaninchente: I’d rather listen again to both of your understandings and use those to develop my own. I won’t be sure that it’s true, but I’d have very good reason to believe it.

Alice: Certainly.

Hugo: But if we let go of truth, as in being correct, don’t we also get rid of being wrong? Some things are obviously wrong. Never mind doing unjust harm, this simple equation 1 = 2 is simply wrong.

Alice: And 1 = 1 is simply correct—as long as we agree what 1 and = mean. We can interface with truths defined within our experience. It is just the external truths that Mr. K and I are starting to dislike.

Hugo: Yes, I suppose. We’ll have to talk about morality another time.

Alice: In any case, what about things we want to talk about without knowledge of them?

Turning to Understanding

Hugo: Like conjecture? I’d like to hear more.

Alice: To take an example, I think it will rain soon, but I also acknowledge it might not. I am not sure of either option, therefore I don’t know either one. As we were saying before, I assign a pretty high credence to my belief that it will rain.

Hugo: I see, unless the credence is absolute, the belief wouldn’t be knowledge. We live with all sorts of those beliefs.

Alice: Right… actually, we’ve never really relied on external truth in this conversation, but only on understanding, which is justified belief. By testing and otherwise developing our understanding, we conceive of ideas of truth, ideas of knowledge, and even ideas of understanding.

Hugo: Oh, I see. I think you are right, truth is somehow less fundamental than understanding.

Alice: In the same sense that language is more fundamental than physics, to us, since we need language to do any physics.

Hugo: I’d like to seek clarification from your own understanding: I know what a belief is, but what exactly counts as justification?

Justification and Support

Alice: A justification of a belief is any belief that provides support to the justified one. When the justifications are reasonable enough to convince their holder, we can call the combination understanding.

Hugo: Of course. I can’t think of a better alternative. Let’s see… when I believe that I saw a rain cloud, and I believe that seeing rain clouds often means it will rain, and believe that those are sufficient reasons to believe that it will rain, I understand that it will rain. Regardless of it actually being the case or not.

Alice: Right.

Mr. Kaninchente: Since I’ve heard people call me all sorts of things, but don’t see them compelling enough to classify myself as rabbit, duck, or some permutation of both, I don’t really understand myself as any of those. I’m satisfied with this answer. I’m me, no need to think about it too hard.

Alice: I’m glad you’ve come to some understanding of yourself, Mr. K.

Mr. Kaninchente: Danke schön, Alice, Hugo, you have been most helpful.

Alice: Thank you for your provocative questions!

Clarification

Hugo: Alice, what about languages? If you can understand German, what is the belief, and what is the justification?

Alice: That’s different. We do say that we understand certain things, but the understanding that is justified belief only applies when we do have a belief of the form of an assertion, which could be assigned a truth value.

Hugo: Like “Mr. K is a rabbit,” but not like “Happy Birthday!”

Alice: Absolutely. Likewise, a language, as a whole, can’t be true or false.

Hugo: I see. Then we don’t mean this understanding when understanding German. Curiously, we do when we understand that we understand German.

Mr. Kaninchente: Oh, that makes sense.

Hugo: But then what is development of understanding? If we don’t have a truth that we can use to measure progress, this is a vitally important matter. How would development of understanding work?

Development of Understanding

Alice: Let’s see. Development involves change, and it should somehow be positive—but how could a change be considered positive without considering truth?

Hugo: Well, we’ve got three elements to consider: credence, justification, and support. Why don’t we go with credence?

Alice: Why should we? We should think it through and establish reasons. If we don’t, it couldn’t be understanding. That’s it! So long as support for beliefs has a net increase, any change is development. Gosh, I am so smart.

Hugo: That formulation makes sense. To delve a bit deeper, then, what kinds of changes are possible where support is increased?

Alice: I can find a few. If I gained new evidence for a belief, like that Mr. K enjoys carrots, that will be more support for him being a rabbit. This could be called rooting, making foundations more stable by connecting a belief with more support.

Hugo: I concur! Also, you just went the other way: you slowly ventured through your understanding and created some insight.

Alice: Insight is the belief I justified, that wasn’t there at first, right?

Hugo: You are most correct.

Alice: So what should this type of development be called?

Mr. Kaninchente: Since it arose from the combination of prior beliefs, how about calling this synthesis?

Alice: I like it. Rooting and synthesis.

Hugo: I’ve noticed something we’ve missed. It is quite crucial to this picture!

Alice: What is it?

Hugo: How do we get beliefs in the first place? I don’t mean those through synthesis, but before they are even understanding?

Alice: Quite an oversight! Well, taking a step back, what you have just said developed my understanding.

Hugo: How so?

Alice: Well, first, I must have gotten some belief of what you said. Through synthesis and rooting, I formed a network of understanding that found it a credible belief that forming beliefs must be understood.

Hugo: Wow! That is quite lucid of you. It seems like the process was triggered by a new belief that wasn’t synthesized through understanding. It just appeared to you.

Alice: That’s exactly what it felt like, in retrospect.

Mr. Kaninchente: Could you explore this a bit more?

Alice: Of course! I suppose I generated this belief of what you said based on my sense data. It’s not that I consciously chose to; it all happened subconsciously.

Mr. Kaninchente: A sensible sentiment.

Hugo: Perplexing! What to call this?

Alice: Call it sensing. After all, it was simply what my body came to believe through sense experience alone—even if I didn’t believe you exist, at some level I would have the belief that you said those things.

Hugo: That seems right to me, but it is really just a name.

Mr. Kaninchente: The names aren’t so important. The concepts should take center stage.

Alice: I think so too, but it is good nonetheless to have clear terminology. Also, you implied that it was clear how these beliefs are formed through synthesis. It’s not simple to me.

Hugo: How so? Two or more beliefs combine to form a new one.

Alice: Yes, but how do they do so?

Hugo: The brain constantly tries to make sense of things. It tries to make connections between concepts and ideas. It seems to me that synthesis is one type of this connection-building.

Alice: Most clever. I agree wholeheartedly.

Mr. Kaninchente: Now you’ve made me curious! I would like to, on another occasion, dive deeper into this.

Alice: I concur! Mr. K, do you see that cottage?

Mr. Kaninchente: Yes, as I understand it! What about it?

Alice: That is our destination—a symbol that our conversation must soon come to an end. Is there anything we’ve neglected?

Reaching Home

Hugo: What about when we, for lack of a better word, destroy old support in favor of new ones?

Alice: Hmm. Destruction of support, of course, does not increase understanding on its own. However, if we destroy support for a reason, this would be like adding anti-support for what we believed, and support for not believing it.

Hugo: I can somewhat see. It may help to find a way to diagram these things.

Alice: I agree. Let us do that sometime by the blackboard.

Hugo: Great. But then what about simply increasing credence of justification?

Alice: You mean, “is increasing credence development of understanding?”

Hugo: Right. And if it isn’t, I still feel like it should be.

Alice: I say it isn’t. What are the reasons for the new credence? If there are some, this is rooting, or is that incorrect?

Hugo: That’s correct.

Alice: If there aren’t, how is this change considered “positive” in any sense?

Hugo: Well, of course it’s positive: you are increasing reason to believe if you increase credence of a reason.

Alice: The problem I have is that if the increase in credence isn’t justified. The increase is arbitrary.

Hugo: I am beginning to see your point.

Alice: Yes. I was wrong in my previous assertion of development.

Hugo: How so?

Alice: In development of understanding, some new supporting link must be made. Merely learning facts doesn’t cut it, and just increasing credence doesn’t either.

Hugo: I’ll have to think about it more on my own, but I think you are correct.

Alice: Great. In any case, we’ve reached our destination.

Hugo: Quite so. Mr. Kaninchente, would you like to join us for brunch?

Mr. Kaninchente: Of course! So long as I do not impose.

Alice: No, not at all. It would be our pleasure to treat our new friend.

Hugo: Let us put this discussion to rest, and talk again soon—at that point let us discuss the various ways we develop understanding, at a level higher up than simple rooting, synthesis, and sensing.

Alice: Perhaps we will address the issue of morality you raised, or a way to diagram understanding.

Hugo: Oh, good. Mr. Kaninchente, do you like Borscht?

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